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SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
District Court Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The Third Judicial District Court had original jurisdiction as the trial court in this 
criminal matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78-3-4(1) 
Court of Appeals Jurisdiction 
The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-
2(3)(I). The matter was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals on March 13,1997. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-
3(2)(j). 
Order on Appeal 
The defendant appeals from the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for New Trial (filed March 15, 2002); Aplt. A-74. 
The defendant further appeals from his convictions on two counts of Aggravated 
Robbery, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-302, as amended, in 
the final written Order ofFinalJudgment, Sentence and Commitment (filed November 
13,2002);^//.A-86. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Issue of Argument I: 
Whether the trial court improperly prevented the defense from cross examining the 
victim's regarding their immigration status, in violation of the right of confrontation, 
which if allowed would have established that they were both illegal aliens, and that at 
least one had previously been deported, establishing that they were not credible about the 
existence of the contents of their wallets and as to whether their wallets were taken. 
Objection Preserving Issue: On April 16,2001, the State of Utah filed a motion in 
limine, together with a memorandum, to preclude the defense from inquiring into the 
victims immigration status, acknowledging that they were both illegal aliens. Motion in 
Limine Re: Victims' Immigration and Custody Status (filed April 16, 2001) Aplt. A-26; 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Victims' Immigration and Custody 
Status (filed April 16, 2001) Aplt. A-28. Oral arguments on the states motion in limine 
were held on April 24,2001. At trial defense counsel attempted to cross examine the first 
of the two victims regarding their immigration status, and was precluded from doing so 
upon the state's objections. Tr. p. 147. Defense counsel was then under the onus of 
contempt and did not engage in similar cross examination of the second victim. 
Standard of Review: The right of confrontation is a question of law based on a 
2 
constitutional right that is reviewed for correctness, while the question of law requires the 
application of the facts to construe the standard, requiring the incorporation of the clearly 
erroneous standard for the subsidiary factual determinations. See, State v. Hubbard, 48 
P.3d 953, 962 (Utah 2002). 
Issue of Argument II: 
Whether it was plain error for the government to have a law enforcement officer 
testify that a co-defendant's stated that Mr. Langi had the wallet in violation of the right 
of confrontation 
Objection Preserving Issue: No objection was made at trial and therefore is brought on 
appeal under the plain error standard. See, Tr. p. 133. 
Standard of Review: The court will review error for which no objection is made under 
the plain error standard of (1) whether error existed, (2) whether the error should have 
been obvious to the court and (3) whether the error was prejudicial. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). The right of confrontation is a question of law based on a 
constitutional right and is reviewed for correctness, while the question of law requires the 
application of the facts to construe the standard, requiring the incorporation of the clearly 
erroneous standard for the subsidiary factual determinations. See, State v. Hubbard, 48 
P.3d 953,962 (Utah 2002). 
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Issue of Argument III: 
Whether it was plain error for the trial court to allow a law enforcement officer to 
testify as to his lay interpretation of the events depicted on a video showing the events in 
violation of the right of confrontation. 
Objection Preserving Issue: No objection was made at trial and therefore is brought 
on appeal under the plain error standard. See, Tr. p. 117. 
Standard of Review: The court will review error for which no objection is made under 
the plain error standard of (1) whether error existed, (2) whether the error should have 
been obvious to the court and (3) whether the error was prejudicial. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). The right of confrontation is a question of law based on a 
constitutional right and is reviewed for correctness, while the question of law requires the 
application of the facts to construe the standard, requiring the incorporation of the clearly 
erroneous standard for the subsidiary factual determinations. See, State v. Hubbard, 48 
P.3d 953, 962 (Utah 2002). 
Issue of Argument IV: 
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the government to introduce evidence 
through the prosecution's impeachment of its own witness. 
Objection Preserving Issue: This issue was preserved on appeal by the defense's 
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objection. Tr. p. 204-205. 
Standard of Review: The introduction of statements in connection with criminal 
conduct are reviewed as a matter of law for correctness. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
239 (Utah 1992). 
Issue of Argument V: 
Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based 
on the newly discovered evidence that established that the co-defendant's material 
statement to law enforcement prior to trial was false. 
Objection Preserving Issue: The issue was preserved by the defendant by motion; 
Motion for a New Trial (filed May 31, 2001) & Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial (filed June 25,2001) Aplt. A-33 & A-36. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review when the court reviews the denial of a 
motion for a new trial is the clear abuse of discretion by the trial court standard. State v. 
Colwelli, 2000 UT 8, \ 12, 994 P.2d 177; State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
RULES AND REGULATIONS REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
IN THIS APPEAL 
Federal Constitutional Provisions 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment 
State Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7 
Federal Statutes 
8U.S.C. §1182 
8U.S.C. §1325 
8U.S.C. §1326 
State Statutes 
U.C. § 53-3-205 
U.C. § 76-6-302 
Rules 
U.R.E. 701 
U.R.E. 704 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant was convicted of two counts of Aggravated Robbery, both first degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, as amended, with gun and gang 
enhancements. 
Course of Proceedings 
On October 13,2000, Mr. Langi was charged in an information with two counts of 
Aggravated Robbery, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
302, as amended, with gun and gang enhancements, was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah, Dock. No. 001917415. A preliminary hearing was held on 
December 5,2000, before the Hon. Paul G. Maughn, and Mr. Langi was bound over to 
stand trial on both counts. Also on December 5,2000, the case was assigned to the Hon. 
Judith S. Atherton, District Judge. Mr. Langi was arraigned on December 18, 2000, and 
plead not guilty to both counts. 
On April 16,2001, the Final Pretrial Conference was held and the State of Utah filed a 
motion in limine, together with a memorandum, to preclude the defense from inquiring 
into the victims immigration status, acknowledging that they were both illegal aliens. 
Motion in Limine Re: Victims' Immigration and Custody Status (filed April 16,2001) 
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Aplt. A-26; Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: Victims' Immigration and 
Custody Status (filed April 16, 2001) Aplt A-28. Oral arguments on the states motion in 
limine were held on April 24,2001, at which time the court addressed the question of the 
defense cross examining the victims5 immigration statice. Trial began the next day, on 
April 25,2001 and continued through April 26,2001, at which time the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on both counts against Mr. Langi. 
At the end of the first day of trial, April 25,2001, the government moved to hold 
defense counsel in contempt of court for the violation of the Order granting motion in 
limine, which the trial court took under advisement at that time. At the conclusion of 
trial, on April 26,2001, the court held defense counsel in contempt of court for violation 
of the Order granting the motion in limine. On May 23,2001, defense counsel paid the 
contempt fine. 
On June 11, 2001, Mr. Langi was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of nine (9) 
years to life for the convictions of aggravated robbery with gun and gang enhancements. 
No fine was imposed, but he was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $3,728. 47. 
Mr. Langi was immediately remanded to the custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff and 
transported to the Utah State Prison. 
Mr. Langi filed a Motion for a New Trial on May 31,2001, prior to Sentencing. On 
June 25, 2001, after sentencing, Mr. Langi filed his Memorandum in Support of 
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Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, Aplt. A-36. A hearing was held on the motion for a 
new trial on September 7,2001, which was orally denied with the government to submit 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. On February 20,2002, the defendant filed 
Defendant }s Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
Re: Defendant's Motion for New Trial. On the March 15, 2002, the court denied the 
objections and signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Re: 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial {Aplt A-74) as submitted by the government. 
The written Order of Final Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was entered by the 
trial court on November 13, 2002. A timely notice of appeal was filed on November 26, 
2003. 
Disposition in the District Court 
Appellant was convicted of two counts of Aggravated Robbery, both first degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, as amended on April 26, 2002, and 
sentenced to two indeterminate terms of nine years to life, running concurrently on June 
11, 2002. The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial was filed May 31, 2001; and was 
denied on March 15,2002 in the trial court's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for New Trial, Aplt. A-74. The trial court 
entered its written Order ofFinalJudgment, Sentence and Commitment, Aplt A-86, on 
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November 13,2002. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
During the early morning hours of February 26, 2000, Jose Farias, together with 
Rachel Redding and Gabriel Calvillo went to Beto's restaurant in Kearns, Utah, to have 
dinner. Tr. p. 135-136; Tr. p. 179. Beto's restaurant is a 24-hour, fast food, Mexican 
restaurant. Tr. p. 179. At the time of his arrival at the restaurant Mr. Farias was wearing 
an earring in his right eyebrow, he recalls arriving at the restaurant with his wallet. Tr. p. 
136-137. The three ordered their food and sat down at a table to eat. Tr.p.180. While 
they were eating three Polynesian men, Konai Bloomfield, Siaosi Afa, and Joseph Langi 
entered the restaurant. Tr. p. 180, 202, 203. After entering the restaurant they 
approached the table where Mr. Farias, Ms. Redding and Mr. Calvillo were sitting, and 
Mr. Afii said to Mr. Farias, "Everything is cool. We are just here to get something to 
eat." (Tr. p. 181) and Mr. Afii shook Mr. Farias's hand. Tr. p. 158. The three men went 
to the counter to order their food. Tr.p.182. 
While the three men were at the counter Mr. Farias asked Ms. Redding to go to the 
counter and get him a soda. Tr. p. 182. Ms. Redding approached the counter and Mr. 
Farias put on his coat and followed behind her. Tr. p. 182, 187. As she approached the 
counter the three men, who were standing together, let Ms. Redding and Mr. Farias ahead 
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of them. Tr. p. 182. As Ms. Redding was ordering she saw Mr. Farias fall forward, 
hitting his head on the cash register. Tr. p. 183. Mr. Bloomfield punched Mr. Farias, and 
in that single blow knocked him out. Tr. p. 117. 
While Ms. Redding and Mr. Farias were approaching the counter, Mr. Calvillo got up, 
and Mr. Langi stood behind him. Tr.pl 16. When Mr. Bloomfield struck Mr. Farias Mr. 
Langi also struck Mr. Calvillo in the head. Tr. p. 117. Then Mr. Langi went over to Mr. 
Farias and bent over. Tr. p. 117. Officer Lone testified that while Mr. Langi was bent 
over Mr. Farias, Mr. Langi was "going through Farias's pocket." Tr. p. 117. Mr. Langi 
stomped on Mr. Farias's head. Tr. p. 117. After stomping on Mr. Farias's head, Mr. 
Langi went back over to Mr. Calvillo. Tr. p. 117. At which time, Officer Lone testified, 
Mr. Langi went through Mr. Calvillo's pockets. Tr. p. 117. 
Officer Lone first testified that Mr. Calvillo's wallet had been taken, and that Mr. 
Calvillo had lost his cash from a cashed paycheck and his green card. Tr. p. 119. Officer 
Lone testified that a green card is an INS card that establishes a person is legally in the 
country and can work. Tr. p. 119. After Officer Lone had testified that it was Mr. 
Calvillo who had lost the wallet, he changed his testimony indicating that he had been 
mistaken, and that was Mr. Farias who had lost the wallet containing the cashed his 
paycheck and INS card. Tr. p. 119. Officer Lone never investigated whether or not Mr. 
Farias ever had an INS card. Tr. p. 120. Officer Lone never determined whether an INS 
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card existed. Tr.p.127. 
Ms. Redding testified that she did not see anything come out of Mr. Farias's pockets. 
Tr.p,193. 
Mr. Farias had no memory of what happened once he was struck until the next 
morning, as he was unconscious. Tr. p, 137, 139. He testified that when he went to the 
restaurant he had a wallet with him. Tr. p. 136. He stated that Ms. Redding had his 
money and that he did not know if anybody took any money from him. Tr. p. 143-144. 
When he woke up at the hospital he no longer had his eyebrow ring, he did not know 
what had become of it and never found it again. Tr. 141. Mr. Farias acknowledged that 
he was a convicted felon for a weapons charge. Tr. p. 146. However, when asked 
whether he claimed to have had an INS card on the night the incident occurred the court 
sustained an objection on grounds of relevance. Tr.p. 147. Mr. Farias never testified that 
his wallet, or that his money, had been taken. 
After Mr. Farias had testified, but before Mr. Calvillo testified, the Court took a 
recess, at which time the prosecution objected to defense counsel's questions regarding 
the witnesses immigration status pursuant to the motion in limine. Tr. p. 149. The 
prosecution did, however, ask that defense counsel be held in contempt, and the court 
indicated it would reserve on that issue until the end of trial. Tr. p 149-150. At the end of 
the trial the court did, in fact, hold defense counsel in contempt of court and fined him. 
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Tr.p.278. 
Mr. Calvillo testified that when he went to the restaurant he had a wallet with about 
$80 in it, and when he woke up at the hospital he no longer had his wallet, and never got 
it or the money back. Tr. p. 164. He testified he kept his wallet in his back pant pocket. 
Tr. p.-172. He further testified that his clothes were thrown away (implying by the 
hospital). Tr. p. 172. Mr. Calvillo testified that in his wallet there had been a driver's 
license and "some information papers." Tr. p. 174. Defense counsel, under the pending 
contempt charge, did not ask Mr. Calvillo anything about the EMS card, or Mr. Calvillo's 
immigration status. 
It should also be noted that Mr. Calvillo did not testify with regarding to Mr. Farias's 
eyebrow ring. 
It should also be noted that when Officer Lone spoke with Mr. Calvillo, officer Loan 
had Mr. Farias act as translator between Officer Lone and Mr. Calvillo. Tr. p. 127,1. 19-
21. 
This appeal contests the admission of evidence at trial with regard to whether Mr. 
Langi took anything from the victim at the time of the assault and the trial court's failure 
to consider newly discovered evidence after the trial. At trial, counsel for the defendant 
acknowledged Mr. Langi was guilty of the assault, saying, "Mr. Langi admits that he did 
wrong, He did not commit an aggravated robbery. He will plead to you that he is guilty 
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of an assault." Tr. /?. 65,1 15-17. Mr. Langi's assault charges were aggravated because 
the government alleged he "took" something during the course of the assault. 
Information, "unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the possession of... 
or immediate presence." of the victim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Argument I 
The trial erred in preventing the defense from cross examining the two victims about 
the fact that they were illegal aliens, and in holding the defense counsel in contempt for 
attempting to do so. The fact that the victims were illegal aliens meant that they could not 
work, drive, or hold INS cards, which they claimed were in the wallets that were taken. 
The defense should have been permitted to cross examine the victims regarding their 
immigration status as it would have established that they either lied under oath in 
obtaining a paycheck, driver's license or INS card or that they had lied about even having 
the cash from a paycheck, a driver's license or an INS card. Thus establishing their 
propensity to make false statements under oath and negating the existence of wallets and 
the claimed content. 
Argument II 
The government had a law enforcement officer testify that during the interrogation of 
a co-defendant that the co-defendant stated that Mr. Langi had the wallet. This testimony 
directly violated Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,135, 88 S.Ct. 1620,20 L.Ed.2d 
476 (1968). 
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Argument III 
The trial court permitted plain error when it allowed a law enforcement officer to 
testify as to his lay interpretation of the events depicted on a video showing the events in 
violation of the right of confrontation. The testifying officer had watched the video about 
20 times and during the time the jury was watching the video made statements 
interpreting the events depicted. Placing a spin, or interpretation, on the events being 
shown to the jury, when the officer had no personal knowledge of the events is an 
improper use of lay witness opinion evidence. 
Argument IV 
The trial court erred when it allowed the government to introduce evidence through 
the prosecution's impeachment of its own witness. Mr. Afii was called by the 
government for the purpose of introducing evidence that Mr. Langi had a victim's wallet 
after the incident. Instead, Mr. Afu testified that he had no recollection of seeing Mr. 
Langi with a wallet after the incident. The prosecution then impeached Mr. Afii with a 
transcript from a prior interrogation by law enforcement; but the court did not instruct the 
jury that the impeachment could not be considered as evidence. 
16 
Argument V 
The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based on the 
newly discovered evidence that, as conceded by the prosecution, Mr. Afii lied during the 
interrogation by law enforcement when he said that he saw Mr. Langi with a victim's 
wallet after the incident, and that Mr. Afu could not read. The lie about the wallet during 
the interrogation was introduced both through the Bruton violation that is the subject of 
Argument II, and to impeach Mr. Afu which is the subject of Argument IV. 
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ARGUMENTI 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT 
DISCRETION WHEN IT PREVENTED DEFENSE 
COUNSEL FROM CROSS-EXAMINING THE VICTIM 
REGARDING PROPERTY ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN 
STOLEN. 
On April 16, 2003, the government filed a Motion in Limine Re: Victims' Immigration 
and Custody Status, together with a Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine Re: 
Victims' Immigration and Custody Status. In the government's memorandum they state 
that both Mr. Farias and Mr. Calvillo were residing illegally in the United States. 
Memorandum, p. 2, [^3. 
At the pretrial conference the issue of Mr. Farias's and Mr. Calvillo's immigration 
status was briefly mentioned. Defense counsel indicated that the immigration and 
custody status would arise if the government mentioned the matter or if it became 
relevant as a defense, which counsel indicated "is highly probable that it will be." 
Hearing Tr (Apr. 24, 1991) p. 9. The trial court indicated that it could not see how 
immigration status would be relevant. Id. 
Whether Mr. Farias and/or Mr. Calvillo told officer Loan that a wallet having an INS 
card was taken was material to the defense in the present case. An illegal alien being 
questioned by law enforcement would be inherently concerned that their illegal status 
would be discovered and that they would be prosecuted. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1325 it is 
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a federal offense to be present in the United States illegally, and pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1326 it is substantial offense if an illegal alien returns after being deported, and if the 
person was convicted of a violent felony prior to their deportation it constitutes an offense 
for which a person may be imprisoned for 20 years. The fact that an illegal alien faces 
substantial federal criminal charges, especially for aggravated reentry, creates a powerful 
incentive for the illegal alien to tell a law enforcement officer that their wallet was stolen 
or is missing, and that as a consequence they don't have their INS card along with other 
items commonly found in a wallet 
The fact that the victims who claimed to have the wallet that was taken also claim that 
it contained an INS card was both relevant and material to the defense. The defense 
clearly sought to establish that these victims lied about the wallet being stolen with an 
INS card in it to hide the fact that they were illegal aliens. The government has 
acknowledged that they were illegal aliens so they could not have had an INS card, so 
clearly they lied to Officer Lone. The lie about the INS card and their immigration status 
was also materially relevant to whether they cashed a paycheck, as legal presence in the 
United States would be required in order for a person to legally work. No INS card 
means it was illegal for them to work, no work means no paycheck, ergo no cash in the 
wallet, ergo no wallet. 
In the present case the court prevented the defense from establishing the nature and 
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degree of the motivation Mr. Farias and Mr. Calvillo had to lie to Officer Lone, and that 
the illegal immigrant status militated against them having cashed a paycheck or a legal 
driver's license. In other words, the immigration status went to the validity of the entire 
content of the purported wallet, and thus the existence of the wallet itself. Before defense 
counsel was placed under the onus of contempt, he had established grounds to believe Mr. 
Farias was guilty of aggravated reentry for which he could go to federal prison for up to 
20 years for having a prior history for a violent felony, and having been previously 
deported. See, 8 U.S.C. §1326. Counsel was prevented from fully establishing the 
impeachment due to the government's objection. Counsel was then under the onus of 
contempt when he questioned Mr. Calvillo, and consequently could not pursue it to 
establish: (1) there was no INS card, (2) there was no paycheck as such would be in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), or that such work was illegal for which no check issued, 
(3) there was no driver's license, or that such a license was obtained by false oath, 
because U.C. §53-3-205(9)(a)(I)(A)-(F) requires a person to provide their name, place of 
birth, social security or temporary identification number, and residence address. 
It was highly material and relevant in the present case that the victims were illegal 
aliens. The court erred and abused its discretion when it precluded the defense from 
asking questions regarding their immigration status, and the charge and pending contempt 
chilled defense counsels ability and opportunity to conduct an appropriate cross-
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examination which would have established the enormous lack of credibility of Mr. Farias 
and Mr. Calvillo. The fact that the defense was precluded from cross-examining in this 
area prejudiced the defendant, as the lack of a paycheck, cash, an INS card, and drivers 
license would have established that the wallet was fictitious; grounds for the jury to have 
acquitted the defendant of both counts of aggravated robbery. 
ARGUMENT II 
WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO 
HAVE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TESTIFY THAT A CO-
DEFENDANT'S STATED THAT MR. LANGI HAD THE WALLET 
It was plain error for the government to have Officer Lone to testify to the jury that 
during his interview of the co-defendant Mr. Afu, that Mr. Afu had stated that the 
defendant Mr. Langi had thrown the victim's wallet from the car. To establish plain 
error, appellant must show: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). The error in this case is a violation of Bruton and the confrontation 
clause. It should have been obvious to the trial court because of how the question was put 
to the witness by the prosecutor. It was harmful in that the prosecutor concedes Mr. Afu 
lied, and there is no other evidence of Mr. Langi having possession of the wallet, not even 
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from the declarant Mr. Afu. 
The error in the present case arises from an out-of-court statement by a co-defendant 
about a defendant offered for the truth of the matter asserted, introduced by the 
prosecution at trial through the testimony of an investigating officer. The trial court 
should have immediately recognized the Bruton and confrontation violations of the 
testimony when the prosecutor asks the question: Tell me officer what did the co-
defendant say the defendant did? 
Q. My question is this, Detective, When is the first time that you were told that the 
wallet had been thrown out near the Methodist church near Kearns. 
A. During Mr. Afii's interview. 
Q. That was March 23; is that correct? 
A. March 22. 
Q. Did he indicate to you who had thrown the wallet out of the car? 
A. He said that Mr. Langi had. 
Tr.p. 133,1.9-17. 
The values protected by due process and the constitutional right of confrontation, 
which are preserved by both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. U.S. Const. 
Amends. VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12 have been expressed as follows: 
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Classically, the primary object of the constitutional right of confrontation is to 
prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits from being used against the accused at 
trial in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness against 
him. When confrontation is available the accused has an opportunity, not only of 
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling 
him to stand face-to-face with the jury in order that they may look at him and judge 
by his demeanor and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is 
worthy of belief. Encompassed in this right of confrontation is the procedural 
right of cross-examination and the recognition of certain procedural rights 
regarding the exclusion of extra judicial statements, similar to those found 
protected by evidentiary rules excluding hearsay evidence. 
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 785, 778 (Utah 1980)(footnotes omitted); accord Murray 
City v.Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Utah 1983); Mattoxv. United States, 156U.S.237, 
242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339-40, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). 
The general rule is that when an out-of-court statement is offered at trial for the truth 
of the matter asserted and the declarant is present and available for cross-examination, no 
federal or state confrontation problem is presented. State v. Loughton, 1M P.2d 426,429 
(Utah 1987). It has been recognized, on the other hand, that if the declarant is not 
present, the core values of the confrontation right are implicated because ff[t]he essence of 
the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the accusing witness in court and subject 
to cross-examination, so that bias and credibility can be evaluated by the finder of fact." 
State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353,1356 (Utah 1986). In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123,135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the United States Supreme Court holding 
that, regardless of a limiting jury instruction, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
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confrontation is violated "when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying 
codefendant is introduced at their joint trial.11 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207, 
107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). The Court determined that where a confession 
"expressly implicates" the defendant, the jury cannot be assumed to consider such 
"powerfully incriminating" evidence only with regard to the guilt of the declarant. Id. at 
208,107 S.Ct. 1702 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124 n. 1,135, 88 S.Ct. 1620). 
The Bruton and Richardson and confrontation violations are obvious in the present 
case, as they should have been to the trial court. Officer Lone who was testifying about 
what the codefendant Mr. Afii said the defendant Mr. Langi had done. The prosecutor's 
question would clearly alert any trial court to the error when she asked Officer Loan: "Did 
he [referring to Mr. Afii] indicate to you who had thrown the wallet out of the car?" Tr. 
p. 133, l. 15 -17. The classical Bruton and confrontation violation arises when a 
prosecutor asks an officer to tell a jury what a codefendant said the defendant did, it is 
always an error that is immediately apprehendable. 
The testimony by Officer Lone that Mr. Afu stated Mr. Langi threw away the wallet 
violated the rules established by the Bruton and Richardson holdings. Mr. Afii was a co-
defendant making a statement which expressly implicated Mr. Langi. The rule in Bruton 
applies directly to statements by co-defendants. Although the present case is not a joint 
trial, as in Bruton, the present case was likewise not complicated by the need for the 
24 
approved method which requires redaction. See State v. Nield, 804 P.2d 537, 539-40 
(Utah Ct.App.1990). A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is violated 
when a codefendant's statement directly implicating the defendant is introduced at trial 
through an interrogating officer. Clearly there was error in the present case, and it 
constituted an error that should have been obvious to the trial court. 
This error was harmful and in its absence, it is highly likely that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. At trial the prosecution called the co-defendant, Mr. Afii, 
after Officer Lone testified. Mr. Afii testified that he stated that he did not recall seeing 
Mr. Langi with a wallet. Tr. p. 204,1 5-9. Consequently, the prosecutor impeached him, 
during which time Mr. Afii admitted that his testimony was inconsistent with the 
statement he had made to the investigators. Tr. p. 205,1. 21 top. 206,1. 1. Even so, Mr. 
Afii never testified that Mr. Langi ever had the wallet. 
ARGUMENT III 
WHETHER IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
PERMIT A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TO INVADE THE 
PROVINCE OF THE JURY TESTIFY AS TO HIS INTERPRETATION 
OF THE EVENTS DEPICTED ON A VIDEO SHOWING THE EVENTS. 
During the time the jury was viewing the video Officer Lone did more than identify 
the various individuals, he gave a commentary regarding what the jury was viewing. 
Officer Lone invaded the province of the jury when he gave his opinion during the jury's 
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viewing of the video that Mr. Langi was going through Mr. Faria's pockets. 
Officer Lone was not present at Beto's restaurant in Kearns, Utah, on February 26, 
2000, when the events occurred which have precipitated this case. He was assigned to 
conduct the investigation in the case. Tr. p. 104,I. 4-8. However, he did not know any of 
the individuals involved. Tr. p. 107,1 1-4. During his investigation he obtained a video 
of the events from Beto's restaurant. Tr. p. 104,1. 18-20. He watched the video 
approximately 20 times. Tr. p. 16-17, p. 118,1. 23-24. The video tape did not include 
any audio. Tr. p. 110,1. 20-22. 
During the time the video was playing Officer Lone identified the various individuals 
including Gabriel Calvillo, Tr. p. Ill, I. 7; Rachel Redding, Tr. p. Ill, I. 12; Jose Farias, 
Tr. p. 112, I. 3; Siaosi Afu, Jr (aka "George") Tr. p. 114,1. 11, 19; Konai Bloomfield, Tr. 
p. 115,1. 1; and Joseph Langi, Tr. p. 115,1. 3. 
As the events transpired during the critical period of the viewing of video tape at trial 
Officer Lone testified to his interpretation of the events, stating: 
THE WITNESS: She walks over here and stands here for a second. Mr. 
Bloomfield gets his change. And you will see the defendant at today's trial, Mr. 
Langi, walk over here and he will stand behind Gabriel Calvillo. The assault starts 
simultaneously. See Mr. Bloomfield punch Farias in the head and knock him out, 
and simultaneously this is Mr. Langi punching Calvillo in the head, full blast, 
alternate fists, blow after blow. Afu, he engages in the attach initially, then he 
leaves, walks outside to get the car. Langi comes over, bends over and starts going 
through Farias's pocket. 
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MR. GOTAY: Objection --
THE COURT: Lets not argue. I will rule on it. The objection is overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Then he starts stomping on his head, nearly slips and falls. Walks 
back over and goes through Calvillo's pockets. 
Tr.p. 116,1. 22 top. 117,1. 13. 
The facts shown in the video speak for themselves, and it was inappropriate for 
Officer Lone to add his interpretation and comment to what was being seen by the jury. 
The commentary regarding the assault are not germane to this appeal. However, Offer 
Lone's commentary with respect to what, if anything, Mr. Langi was doing with respect 
to Mr. Farias and Mr. Calvillo is highly relevant and unduly prejudicial to Mr. Langi. 
Officer Lone's testimony is merely his interpretation and opinion that Mr. Langi was 
going through the pockets. 
Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows a lay witness to give an opinion. 
Under Rule 701, a lay person can give opinion testimony if the opinion is "(a) rationally 
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness1 testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Utah R.Evid. 701. 
In the present case Officer Lone's ability to perceive the evidence was not better than 
that of any other member of the jury. The jury was in a position to view the video, and if 
it so desired to review it if necessary. Moreover, Officer Lone's perception of the video 
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was identical to that the jury had, he viewed exactly the same video as was in evidence. 
Officer Lone's testimony was not helpful to a clear understanding of a factual issue, 
rather it was an interpretation given to the facts in the light favorable to the government. 
Officer Lone was not at the scene when the crime occurred. He did not use any special 
tools or techniques in viewing the video. He was not testifying to anything more than the 
jury would experience first hand by watching the video. Instead, he was giving an 
official governmental commentary as to the interpretation to be given to the conduct 
shown on the video. 
The Rules of Evidence state that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704; accord State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 
1362 (Utah 1993). However, Rule 704 does not allow all opinions. See Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah Ct.App.1991). InDavidson, this court stated,ff '[t]he 
Advisory Committee notes [to Rule 704] make it clear that questions which would merely 
allow the witness to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is the rule 
intended to allow a witness to give legal conclusions.1" Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)). In the present 
case, Officer Lone's commentary was simply telling the jury that when they observed Mr. 
Langi with each victim they were to conclude that his conduct was that of going through 
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their pockets, the clear implication being that he was looking for something to take. 
"The determination of whether [a witness's] opinion embraces an ultimate factual issue 
or constitutes a legal conclusion is a difficult call because f[t]here is no bright line 
between permissible questions under Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal 
responses.1 " Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493 (quoting Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1231). However, 
the determination in the present case is simplified in that Officer Lone's testimony was 
merely a commentary on how the jury should interpret the same video he had watched. 
He was not a witness with first hand knowledge of the events, he was not a witness 
providing expert technical information, he was merely the government's spokesman 
providing the official government spin on the events being observed. 
It is well settled that, "like any other evidentiary ruling, an erroneous decision to admit 
or exclude evidence ... cannot result in reversible error unless the error is harmful." 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. An error is harmful only if "absent the error there is a 
reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1221. Reversal is required when an error undermines confidence in the verdict. See 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. To that end, the analysis includes, among other things, the 
importance of the challenged testimony and the overall strength of the State's case in 
evaluating whether an error is harmful. See id. In the present case Officer Lone's 
statements were highly improperly prejudicial. There is more than a reasonable 
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likelihood, there is a significant likelihood that the verdict as to both aggravated robbery 
convictions would have been different in the absence of Officer Lone's play-by-play 
interpreting the conduct shown on the video. Consequently, due to the improper lay 
opinion offered by Officer Lone, the convictions in the present case should be reversed 
and remanded for new trial. 
ARGUMENT IV 
WHETHER IT WAS ERROR WHEN THE PROSECUTION WAS 
PERMITTED TO IMPEACH ITS OWN WITNESS AND THE JURY 
WAS NOT INSTRUCTED THAT IMPEACHMENT IS NOT EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Afu was called at trial and proceeded to testify that he did not remember Mr. 
Langi having anything with him after the incident, when Mr. Langi got in the car. 
Q. Do you recall whether the defendant had anything with him when he got into your 
car? 
A. You know what, I really don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember if he had anything in his hand? 
A. No. I don't remember - no, I don't. 
Tr. p. 204,1.5-9. 
The prosecution then proceeded to impeach Mr. Afu, and impeachment based 
exclusively on what Mr. Afu had previously stated to the investigators and which it has 
conceded was a lie at the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial. 
MR. GOTAY: Objection, your Honor, she is impeaching her own witness. 
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MS. WHISSLER: Your Honor, the rules of evidence specifically allow me to impeach 
my own witness. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
Q. Do you recall telling the detective when the defendant got into your car he had the 
wallet with him. 
A. No, I don't recall, but if that's what I told him then ... 
MS. WHISSLER: May I approach the witness, you Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. Are you aware of the interview you had with Detective Lone was audio recorded? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was it that you told Detective Lone when you were interviewed? 
A. Do you want me to read this? 
Q. I just want - 1 want to ask you if that refreshes your memory about what you told 
Detective Lone. 
A. Yes, this is what I told him, I guess. It was too long ago. I don't really remember 
what I said. But, yeah, this is what I said. If it was on tape, this is everything I said. 
Q. That transcript accurately reflects the interview you had with Detective Lone. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you not tell Detective Lone it was the defendant that had a wallet in his hand 
when he got into your car? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you also tell Detective Lone that the defendant threw the wallet out of the car 
at some point? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Tr.p. 204,1.15 to p. 206, LI. 
It has long been a matter of well settled law in Utah that impeachment is not evidence. 
In State v. Burns, 51 Utah 73,168 P. 955 (Utah 1917) the court held that statements made 
by witnesses out of court, contrary to their testimony, can be considered only as to their 
credibility, and not as evidence of the facts. Burns involved a defendant that was 
convicted of having carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of 15 years. Id. In Burns 
the Court, reviewed the jury instruction regarding evidence, which stated: 
Evidence has been introduced of statements made by witnesses out of court, 
contrary to the testimony given by them upon the witness stand. And you are 
instructed that such evidence cannot be considered by you as any proof of the facts 
contained in such statements, but can only be considered as affecting the 
credibility of such witnesses, and the weight that should be given to their 
testimony.'' (emphasis original) 
Id. at 956. In upholding this instruction, focusing on the emphasized language, the court 
noted: 
Impeaching evidence of the character referred to in the instruction is admissible for 
the sole purpose of informing the jury that the witness in question has made 
contradictory or conflicting statements regarding a particular fact in issue. The 
jury may thus take those statements into consideration in determining the 
credibility of the witness and the weight that should be given to his testimony. In 
any other respect the evidence is merely hearsay, and hence not competent to 
establish the facts contained in the conflicting statements which it is alleged were 
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made by the witness. 
Id. See also, State v. Herrera, 338 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1958). 
Prior to State v. Chynoweth, 41 Utah 354, 126 P. 302 (Utah 1912) the Utah Supreme 
Court stated the controlling rule of law: 
A witness may be impeached by proof of verbal statements made by him out of 
court upon a material point, which are contradictory of his testimony on the trial, 
though such statements are not admissible as independent evidence upon the 
merits. 
Id. at 305. Chynoweth was a case involving the theft of a heifer calf. The court, 
addressing the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, noted, "[t]he rule is elementary that 
'what a witness, who is not a party, states out of court is not evidence in chief to prove the 
fact as stated by him, but can only be shown to discredit his testimony at the trial, when 
his testimony is contradicted by such outside statements. The effect of proving 
contradictory statements extends no further than the question of credibility; it does not 
tend to establish the truth of the matter embraced in the contradictory statements; it 
simply goes to the credibility of the witness.9" Id. (emphases original). The rule has been 
so axiomatic that Utah has only these few seminal cases addressing this rule of law. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has more recently followed this axiom of law. In 
United States v. Lemon, 497 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974) the Tenth Circuit noted that prior 
inconsistent statements are admissible to impeach or discredit one's witness. Id. at 857 
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(citing, United States v. Eaton, 485 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1973); Brooks v. United States, 
309 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962)). The Lemon court went on to note that: 
"[s]uch statements are admissible solely for purposes of impeachment, and then 
only insofar as they serve to remove the damage of surprise. Such statements 
cannot be used, by indirection, to present testimony to the jury which the 
Government expected the witness to supply directly. United States v. Hill, 481 
F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1973) a prior inconsistent statement may be used solely 
insofar as it relates to credibility, and in no event is it to be considered for the truth 
of its contents. United States v. Gilliam, 484 F.2d 1093 (D.C.Cir. 1973)." 
Id 
In the present case Mr. Afu testified that he had no recollection of Mr. Langi having 
the wallet. It was highly prejudicial for the court to permit the prosecution to use the 
impeachment as evidence that Mr. Langi had the wallet. 
A perhaps more significant prejudice to Mr. Langi is that Mr. Afu's testimony 
compounds the Bruton err, and the violation of Mr. Langi's Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation. The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment which made applicable 
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, is not violated by admitting a declarant's 
out-of-court statements, so long as the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to 
cross-examination. The purpose of the amendment is satisfied because the declarants 
appeared as witnesses in court, under oath, subject to cross-examinettion, and their 
demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact. California v. Green 399 U.S. 149,90 S.Ct. 
1930,26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). In the present case, however, the declarant appeared and 
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testified that he did not recall the facts to which Officer Lone testified. Consequently, the 
declarant testified contrary to the assertion made by Officer Lone. The prosecution then 
impeached Mr. Afu. This compounds the egregiousness of the Bruton violation because 
the impeachment makes Officer Lone's statement about what Mr. Afu said Mr. Langi did 
appear as more acceptable and credible as evidence. In reality it is nothing more than 
inadmissible hearsay being offered by the prosecution in a Bruton violation, and then 
being bolstered by impeachment. This violation of the confrontation clause is highly 
prejudicial, rendered even more significant because Mr. Afii's impeachment was used to 
corroborate Officer Lone's improper statement. Both Officer Lone's statement as to what 
Mr. Afu said about what Mr. Langi did, and the impeachment of Mr. Afu were 
improperly introduced by the government and used improperly as evidence in the present 
case and as such require a reversal of the aggravated robbery convictions in the present 
case. 
ARGUMENT V 
WHETHER IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT ESTABLISHED THAT THE 
CO-DEFENDANT'S MATERIAL STATEMENT TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT PRIOR TO TRIAL WAS FALSE 
After the trial Mr. Afu swore out a statement for the defense in which he stated, in 
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relevant part, ffI DID NOT SEE JOE TOOK OR STEAL ANYTHING FROM THE 2 
VICTIMS, BECAUSE I HAVE LEFT THE SEEN TO PICK UP THE VEHICLE." 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant fs Motion for a New Trial Exhibit 1. The 
government interviewed Mr. Afu in its preparation of its memorandum in response to the 
defendant's Motion for a New Trial. Mr. Afu told the governments investigator that he 
had lied during the first investigative interview about Mr. Langi taking the wallet. 
KJ: Okay, You mentioned that you did lie to the investigator but I couldn't see where 
you did okay so if you can try to explain to me where you think you lied to the 
investigator? 
SA: Well I got, see the thing was, when we first got caught... 
KJ:Uh-huh. 
SA: I never thought Joe would get caught so when we interviewed with the 
investigator, I told the investigator I put everything on Joe. 
KJ:Uh-huh. 
SA: So when there was, you know when he asked about wallets I was like, "Yeah he 
took them and.. . 
KJ:Uh-huh. 
SA: And he asked me where I, where he threw them and I told him see the whole 
statement about Joe was all incorrect cause I knew Joe 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial, Exhibit titled "Siaosi 
Afu Purjury Transcripts"p. 8, See. Aplt. A-45, 54. The State's own evidence shows that 
36 
Mr. Afu lied about Mr. Langi ever having the wallet. 
Additionally, Mr. Afu stated can only read a little English. Id., p. 1 & 4; Aplt. A-45 
&49. 
At the hearing on the Motion for New Trial the prosecution conceded that Mr. Afu had 
lied to the investigators. "Well, the State concedes that he lied to investigators, he told 
the jury that he lied to investigators. He told the jury he had lied about certain things that 
he was interviewed about by Detective Jeff Lund [sic, Lone]. Those are things that were 
known to the defendant at the time of trial. . ." Motion Hearing, Sept. 7,2001, p. 9,1.15 
- 21. There is only one matter which could even be considered the "certain things" 
referred to by the prosecutor, that is that Mr. Afu lied to the investigators when he said 
that Mr. Langi had the wallet. The state expressly conceded at the motion hearing that 
Mr. Afu lied when he stated to investigators that Mr. Langi had the wallet. 
Mr. Afu's lie that Mr. Langi had the wallet is the very fact which the state relied upon 
at trial to establish that something had been "taken" at trial.1 The government first 
1
 Mr. Afu's lie consistently appears in the evidence acquired by both the government 
and the defendant with respect to the Motion for New Trial and Request for Evidentiary Hearing 
Aplt. A-33. See, Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, Exhibit 1, 
Aplt. A-36 & Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial, Exhibit uSiaosi 
Afu Purjury Transcripts, p. 9, Aplt. A-54. 
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introduced Mr. Afu's lie through the testimony of Officer Lone. Tr. p. 133,1 15-17? In 
State v. Calliham, 55 P.3d 573 (Utah 2002) the court stated "a criminal conviction 
procured by the knowing use of false testimony" must be vacated "if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." State v. 
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 (Utah 1984). In Cunningham the defendant failed to identify any 
false testimony offered at trial. In the present case it is clear that Afu's statement to 
officers was false, and that the false statement was offered at trial through the testimony 
of Officer Lone. One of the seminal dangers raised by a violation of the confrontation 
clause is that false statements made out-of-court, such as Mr. Afu lie, improperly become 
the evidence of the case through the Bruton violation and the improper use of 
impeachment as evidence, previously addressed in this brief. 
It is significant that the government has acknowledged that Mr. Afii's statement that 
Mr. Langi had the wallet was a lie for another reason in connection with the trial court's 
err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. It is this lie which was relied upon 
and improperly introduced by the government in violation of Bruton, and which was the 
basis of the impeachment of Mr. Afu at trial when Mr. Afu said he did not recall Mr. 
2
 It should be noted that the focus of the argument here is that it is now known a lie was 
introduced and relied upon by the government at trial, and not that at the time of trial the 
prosecutor knew Mr. Afu statement was a lie. There is no evidence in the record to support or 
even merit consideration of the later circumstance. 
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Langi with the wallet. 
It was error, and a blatant error in violation of the confrontation clause for Officer 
Lone to testify with regard to what Mr. Afu said he saw Mr. Langi do. The fact that the 
statement by Mr. Afu to Officer Lone was false and was brought in by both Officer 
Lone's testimony and through Mr. Afu's impeachment compounds the significance of the 
newly discovered evidence as asserted by the defendant in his Motion for New Trial 
Aplt A-33. The extraordinary degree of prejudice to Mr. Langi is that after the trial the 
prosecutor who was the proponent of the statement conceded that the out-of-court 
statement was false. Motion Hearing, Sept. 7, 2001, p. 9,1. 12-19. There could be no 
o 
greater injustice, no greater miscarriage of justice, than that of permitting a conviction to 
stand based on a prosecution premised upon the introduction of a statement through a 
Bruton violation and impermissible impeachment hearsay, in violation of the 
confrontation clause and for which the government acknowledges is a lie. The 
convictions of Mr. Langi on both counts of aggravated robbery should therefore be 
reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence of Mr. 
Afu's lie during police interrogation being used as evidence at trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Error is first assigned to the trial in preventing the defense from cross examining the 
two victims about the fact that they were illegal aliens, and in holding the defense counsel 
in contempt for attempting to do so. The defense should have been permitted to cross 
examine the victims regarding their immigration status as it would have established that 
they either lied under oath in obtaining a paycheck, driver's license or INS card or that 
they had lied about even having the cash from a paycheck, a driver's license or an INS 
card. 
Second, plain error is assigned to the government having a law enforcement officer 
testify that during the interrogation of a co-defendant that the co-defendant stated that Mr. 
Langi had the wallet in violation of the right of confrontation and the rule in Bruton, 391 
U.S. at 135. 
Third, plain error is assigned to the trial court allowing a law enforcement officer to 
testify as to his lay interpretation of the events depicted on a video showing the events in 
violation of the right of confrontation. The officer had no personal knowledge of the 
events is an improper use of law witness opinion evidence, thus invading the province of 
the jury as the finder of fact. 
Fourth, err is assigned to the government introducing evidence through the 
impeachment of its own witness. The witness's failure to provide the government with 
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testimony that Mr. Langi had a wallet after the incident lead to the government's 
impeachment of Mr. Afu based on a pretrial interrogation transcript. In error, the 
impeachment occurred without the trial court instructing the jury that the impeachment 
could not be considered as evidence. 
The fifth and final error is assigned to the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion 
for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence that Mr. Afu lied during the 
interrogation by law enforcement and could not read. The government conceded that Mr. 
Afu lied during the interrogation by law enforcement and the undue prejudice arises 
because it was the statements of Mr. Afu during the interrogation that were introduced 
both through the officer's Bruton violation, and the transcript which was used for the 
impeachment that was introduced as evidence. 
Each of these errors constitute grounds for the reversal and remand of Mr. Langi's 
convictions in the present case, and warrant the award of a new trial. 
State Relief Sought 
It is respectfully requested that Mr. Langi's convictions on two counts of Aggravated 
Robbery, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, as 
amended, with gun and gang enhancements, be reversed and vacated, that the matter be 
remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
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UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 8. ALIENS AND NATIONALITY 
CHAPTER 12-IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 
SUBCHAPTER II-IMMIGRATION 
PART II-ADMISSION QUALIFICATIONS FOR ALIENS: TRAVEL CONTROL OF CITIZENS 
AND ALIENS 
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Current through P.L. 108-58, (excluding P.L. 108-36) 
approved 07-14-03 
8 U.S.C. S 1182. Inadmissible aliens 
(a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible 
to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States: 
(5) Labor certification and qualifications for certain immigrants 
(A) Labor certification 
(i) In general 
Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is 
inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the 
Attorney General that-
(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an 
alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United 
States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and 
(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in 
the United States similarly employed. 
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UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 8. ALIENS AND NATIONALITY 
CHAPTER 12-IM MIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 
SUBCHAPTER II-IMMIGRATION 
PART VIII-GENERAL PENALTY PROVISIONS 
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, 
Current through P.L. 108-58, (excluding P.L. 108-36) 
approved 07-14-03 
§ 1325. Improper entry by alien 
(a) Improper time or place; avoidance of examination or inspection; misrepresentation and concealment of facts 
Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by 
immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3) attempts to enter or obtains 
entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, 
shall, for the first commission of any such offense, be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or 
both, and, for a subsequent commission of any such offense, be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 
years, or both. 
(b) Improper time or place; civil penalties 
Any alien who is apprehended while entering (or attempting to enter) the United States at a time or place other than 
as designated by immigration officers shall be subject to a civil penalty of-
(1) at least $50 and not more than $250 for each such entry (or attempted entry); or 
(2) twice the amount specified in paragraph (1) in the case of an alien who has been previously subject to a civil 
penalty under this subsection. 
Civil penalties under this subsection are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any criminal or other civil penalties that may 
be imposed. 
(c) Marriage fraud 
Any individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of evading any provision of the immigration 
laws shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined not more than $250,000, or both. 
(d) Immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud 
Any individual who knowingly establishes a commercial enterprise for the purpose of evading any provision of the 
immigration laws shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, fined in accordance with Title 18, or both. 
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8 USCA § 1326 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1326 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 8. ALIENS AND NATIONALITY 
CHAPTER 12-IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 
SUBCHAPTER II-IMMIGRATION 
PART VIII-GENERAL PENALTY PROVISIONS 
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Current through P.L. 108-58, (excluding P.L. 108-36) 
approved 07-14-03 
S 1326. Reentry of removed aliens 
(a) In general 
Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who-
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an order 
of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter 
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at 
a place outside the United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney 
General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously 
denied admission and removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance 
consent under this chapter or any prior Act, 
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 
(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens 
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien described in such subsection-
(1) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, 
crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under Title 
18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; 
(2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined 
under such Title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; 
(3) who has been excluded from the United States pursuant to section 1225(c) of this title because the alien was 
excludable under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or who has been removed from the United States pursuant to the 
provisions of subchapter V of this chapter, and who thereafter, without the permission of the Attorney General, enters 
the United States, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under Title 18 and imprisoned for a period of 10 years, which 
sentence shall not run concurrently with any other sentence. fFNll or 
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(4) who was removed from the United States pursuant to section 1231(a)(4)(B) of this title who thereafter, without 
the permission of the Attorney General, enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States (unless 
the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reentry) shall be fined under Title 18, imprisoned for 
not more than 10 years, or both. 
For the purposes of this subsection, the term "removal" includes any agreement in which an alien stipulates to removal 
during (or not during) a criminal trial under either Federal or State law. 
(c) Reentry of alien deported prior to completion of term of imprisonment 
Any alien deported pursuant to section 1252(h)(2) fFN21 of this title who enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time 
found in, the United States (unless the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reentry) shall be 
incarcerated for the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment which was pending at the time of deportation without 
any reduction for parole or supervised release. Such alien shall be subject to such other penalties relating to the reentry 
of deported aliens as may be available under this section or any other provision of law. 
(d) Limitation on collateral attack on underlying deportation order 
In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may not challenge the validity of the deportation order described 
in subsection (a)(1) of this section or subsection (b) of this section unless the alien demonstrates that-
(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; 
(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for 
judicial review; and 
(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 53. PUBLIC SAFETY CODE 
CHAPTER 3. UNIFORM DRIVER LICENSE ACT 
PART 2. DRIVER LICENSING ACT 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
53-3-205 Application for license or endorsement —Fee required —Tests — 
Expiration dates of licenses and endorsements —Information required — Previous 
licenses surrendered —Driving record transferred from other states —Reinstatement 
—Fee required —License agreement. 
(1) An application for any original license, provisional license, or endorsement 
shall be: 
(a) made upon a form furnished by the division; and 
(b) accompanied by a nonrefundable fee set under Section 53-3-105. 
(2) An application and fee for an original class D license entitle the applicant 
to: 
(a) not more than three attempts to pass both the knowledge and skills tests for 
a class D license within six months of the date of the application; 
(b) a learner permit if needed after the knowledge test is passed; and 
(c) an original class D license and license certificate after all tests are 
passed. 
(3) An application and fee for an original class M license entitle the applicant 
to: 
(a) not more than three attempts to pass both the knowledge and skills tests for 
a class M license within six months of the date of the application; 
(b) a learner permit if needed after the knowledge test is passed; and 
(c) an original class M license and license certificate after all tests are 
passed. 
(4) An application and fee for a motorcycle or taxicab endorsement entitle the 
applicant to: 
(a) not more than three attempts to pass both the knowledge and skills tests 
within six months of the date of the application; 
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(b) a motorcycle learner permit if needed after the motorcycle knowledge test is 
passed; and 
(c) a motorcycle or taxicab endorsement when all tests are passed. 
(5) An application and fees for a commercial class A, B, or C license entitle the 
applicant to: 
(a) not more than two attempts to pass a knowledge test and not more than two 
attempts to pass a skills test within six months of the date of the application; 
(b) a commercial driver instruction permit if needed after the knowledge test is 
passed; and 
(c) an original commercial class A, B, or C license and license certificate when 
all applicable tests are passed. 
(6) An application and fee for a CDL endorsement entitle the applicant to: 
(a) not more than two attempts to pass a knowledge test and not more than two 
attempts to pass a skills test within six months of the date of the application; and 
(b) a CDL endorsement when all tests are passed. 
(7) If a CDL applicant does not pass a knowledge test, skills test, or an 
endorsement test within the number of attempts provided in Subsection (5) or (6), 
each test may be taken two additional times within the six months for the fee 
provided in Section 53-3-105. 
(8) (a) An original license expires on the birth date of the applicant in the 
fifth year following the year the license certificate was issued. 
(b) A renewal or an extension to a license expires on the birth date of the 
licensee in the fifth year following the expiration date of the license certificate 
renewed or extended. 
(c) A duplicate license expires on the same date as the last license certificate 
issued. 
(d) An endorsement to a license expires on the same date as the license 
certificate regardless of the date the endorsement was granted. 
(e) A license and any endorsement to the license held by a person ordered to 
active duty and stationed outside Utah in any of the armed forces of the United 
States, which expires during the time period the person is stationed outside of the 
state, is valid until 90 days after the person has been discharged or has left the 
service, unless the license is suspended, disqualified, denied, or has been 
cancelled or revoked by the division, or the licensee updates the information or 
photograph on the license certificate. 
(9) (a) In addition to the information required by Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, for requests for agency action, each application 
shall: 
(i) state the: 
(A) full legal name; 
(B) birth date; 
(C) sex; 
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(D) between July 1, 2002 and July 1, 2007, race in accordance with the categories 
established by the United States Census Bureau; 
(E) Social Security number or temporary identification number (ITIN) issued by the 
Internal Revenue Service for a person who does not qualify for a Social Security 
number; and 
(F) residence address of the applicant; 
(ii) briefly describe the applicant; 
(iii) state whether the applicant has previously been licensed to drive a motor 
vehicle and, if so, when and by what state or country; 
(iv) state whether the applicant has ever had any license suspended, cancelled, 
revoked, disqualified, or denied in the last six years, or whether the applicant has 
ever had any license application refused, and if so, the date of and reason for the 
suspension, cancellation, revocation, disqualification, denial, or refusal; 
(v) state whether the applicant intends to make an anatomical gift under Title 26, 
Chapter 28, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, in compliance with Subsection (16); 
(vi) provide all other information the division requires; and 
(vii) be signed which may include electronic signatures as defined in Section 
46-4-102. 
(b) An applicant's Social Security number or temporary identification number 
(ITIN) shall be maintained on the computerized records of the division. 
(c) An applicant may not be denied a license for refusing to provide race 
information required under Subsection (9)(a)(i)(D). 
(10) The division shall require proof of every applicant's name, birthdate, and 
birthplace by at least one of the following means: 
(a) current license certificate; 
(b) birth certificate; 
(c) Selective Service registration; or 
(d) other proof, including church records, family Bible notations, school 
records, or other evidence considered acceptable by the division. 
(11) When an applicant receives a license in another class, all previous license 
certificates shall be surrendered and canceled. However, a disqualified commercial 
license may not be canceled unless it expires before the new license certificate is 
issued. 
(12) (a) When an application is received from a person previously licensed in 
another state to drive a motor vehicle, the division shall request a copy of the 
driver's record from the other state. 
(b) When received, the driver's record becomes part of the driver's record in 
this state with the same effect as though entered originally on the driver's record 
in this state. 
(13) An application for reinstatement of a license after the suspension, 
cancellation, disqualification, denial, or revocation of a previous license shall be 
accompanied by the additional fee or fees specified in Section 53-3- 105. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Page 4 
(14) A person who has an appointment with the division for testing and fails to 
keep the appointment or to cancel at least 4 8 hours in advance of the appointment 
shall pay the fee under Section 53-3-105. 
(15) A person who applies for an original license or renewal of a license agrees 
that the person's license is subject to any suspension or revocation authorized 
under this title or Title 41, Motor Vehicles. 
(16) (a) The indication of intent under Subsection (9)(a)(v) shall be 
authenticated by the licensee in accordance with division rule,. 
(b) (i) Notwithstanding Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and 
Management Act, the division may, upon request, release to an organ procurement 
organization, as defined in Section 26-28-2, the names and addresses of all persons 
who under Subsection (9)(a)(v) indicate that they intend to make an anatomical gift. 
(ii) An organ procurement organization may use released information only to: 
(A) obtain additional information for an anatomical gift registry; and 
(B) inform licensees of anatomical gift options, procedures, and benefits. 
(17) The division and its employees are not liable, as a result of false or 
inaccurate information provided under Subsection (9) (a) (v), for direct or indirect: 
(a) loss; 
(b) detriment; or 
(c) injury. 
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U T ST § 76-6-302 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302 
Tfai s document has been updated. Use KEYCITE. 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
PART 3. ROBBERY 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Iiic, a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
76-6-302 Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, 
he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1- 601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course 
of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission 
of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
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UT ST § 78-2a-3 
U.C.A. 1953§78-2a-3 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. Courts 
CHAPTER 2a. COURT OF APPEALS 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
78-2a~3 Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, 
State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and 
the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or 
other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
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degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals fix:iii the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges 
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
4 6b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2-2 
C 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. Courts 
CHAPTER 2. SUPREME COURT 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
78-2-2 Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final 
judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating 
with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions 
of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the 
United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of 
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the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on 
legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over 
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court 
of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for 
writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 4 6b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
A 1 C 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. Courts 
CHAPTER 3. DISTRICT COURTS 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
78-3-4 Jurisdiction —Appeals. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other 
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline 
consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in 
the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de 
novo of the judgments of the justice court and of the small claims department 
of the district court. 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district 
court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review: 
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that 
chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings; and 
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-
703.7. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and 
violations of ordinances only if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 
1996; 
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in 
which the district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed 
a justice court; or 
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single 
criminal episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor. 
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UTR REV Rule 701 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 701 
WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Copr. © West Group 2002. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 9-15-2002. 
RULE 701. OPINION TESTIMONY fi\ LAY WITNESSES 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to 
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim t~ Qrig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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Rule 704-. Opinion on ultimate issue, 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of 
a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the 
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element 
of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for 
the trier of fact alone. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
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USCA CONST Amend. XIV-Full Text 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text 
C 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV-CITIZENSHIP: PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: DUE PROCESS: EQUAL 
PROTECTION: APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION: DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS: 
PUBLIC DEBT: ENFORCEMENT 
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Current through P.L. 108-58, (excluding P.L. 108-36) 
approved 07-14-03 
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP: PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: DUE PROCESS: EQUAL 
PROTECTION: APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION: DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS: PUBLIC 
DEBT: ENFORCEMENT 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, 
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such 
State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, 
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an 
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote 
of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for 
payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But 
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or 
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,> 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
§ 12 fRights of accused persons.1 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, 
to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1,§ 7 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
§ 7 TDue process of law.1 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works; 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
JOHN N. SPIKES, 3062 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSEPH MAKA LANGI 
DOB 12/19/76, 
AKA NONE 
10831 Avenida DeLos Lobos, San Diego, CA 
OTN 
SO# 
Defendant. 
Screened by: J. Spikes 
Assigned to: M. Kouris (Thursday) 
DAO # 00020655 
BAIL: $250,000 
Warrant/Release: Non-jail 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 
The undersigned Detective J. Lone - Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Agency Case No. 
00-24920, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes 
of: 
COUNTI 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 5380 South 4015 West, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 26, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JOSEPH 
MAKA LANGI, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal 
property in the possession of Jose Farias from the person or immediate presence of Jose 
Farias, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a 
dangerous weapon, and/or caused serious bodily injury to Jose Farias. 
NOTICE IS GIVEN pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1, that the defendant is subject 
to an enhanced penalty as provided in that section because the above offense was 
committed in concert with two or more persons. 
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COUNT II 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 5380 South 4015 West, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 26, 2000, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JOSEPH 
MAKA LANGI, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal 
property in the possession of Gabriel Calvillo from the person or immediate presence of 
Gabriel Calvillo, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use 
of a dangerous weapon, and/or caused serious bodily injury to Gabriel Calvillo. 
NOTICE IS GIVEN pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203.1, that the defendant is subject 
to an enhanced penalty as provided in that section because the above offense was 
committed in concert with two or more persons. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
J. Lone, J. Huggard, R. Montanez, C. Chase, L. Prescott, J. Farias, G. Calvillo, R. Garcia, 
M. Pas, R. Briseno and R. Redding. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following: 
1. On February 26, 2000 at 5380 South 4015 West in Salt Lake County, three 
Polynesian males attacked Jose Farias and Gabriel Calvillo at the Beta's Restaurant and robbed 
them. When police responded, both victims were covered in blood. 
2. A security video camera recorded the attack. Witnesses who have watched the 
A-94 
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video and who have viewed photographs of the Defendant state that one of the attackers is in fact 
the Defendant. 
DETECTIVE J. LONE 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
day of October, 2000. 
MAGISTRATE 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YQ60M, District Attorney 
Deputy District Attorney 
October 13,2000 
cw/00020655 
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DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
SIRENA M. WISSLER, Bar No. 7450 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSEPH LANGI, 
Defendant. 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
VICTIMS' IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTODY STATUS 
Case No. 001917415 
Hon. JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
Comes now the State of Utah, by and through its attorneys David E. Yocom, 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County, and Sirena M. Wissler, Deputy District Attorney, 
and moves this Court to enter an order prohibiting defendant from inquiring into or 
making reference to victim Jose Farias's immigration or custody status during the trial in 
the above-captioned matter. This motion is supported by an accompanying 
memorandum. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2001. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Sirena M. Wissler 
Deputy District Attorney 
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UEFEHSE 
COPY 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of April, 2001, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion in Limine re: Victim's Immigration and Custody Status to 
be mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to: Paul Gotay, Attorney at Law, 357 South 
200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
J£LL 
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D AVED E. YOCOM F | L I* L I : ^  ;> 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County LJ L» I t* * '<• W* ^ 
SIRENAM. WISSLER, Bar No. 7450 . „ 
Deputy District Attorney l I X ^ >• ••• 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 I III I f I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 W W G 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSEPH LANGI, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
VICTIMS' IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTODY STATUS 
Case No. 001917415 
Hon. JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, David E. Yocom, District Attorney 
for Salt Lake County, and Sirena M. Wissler, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits 
this memorandum in support of its Motion in Limine re: Victim's Immigration and 
Custody Status. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On February 26, 2000, three persons attacked, beat, and robbed Jose Farias 
and Gabriel Calvillo at Beta's Restaurant in Kearns, Utah. 
2. Defendant Joseph Langi has been identified as one of the persons who 
participated in the beating and robbery of Farias and Calvillo. 
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3. At the time of the attacks on February 26, 2000, Farias and Calvillo were 
residing in the United States illegally, having emigrated here from Mexico. 
4. On or about February 29, 2001, Jose Farias was arrested as a result of his 
immigration status, and detained by the United States Marshal. Mr. Farias is 
currently facing federal charges pertaining to his unlawful presence in the 
United States. 
5. Mr. Farias's federal charge remains pending. He will be held in the custody 
of the Unites States Marshal until such time as the matter is resolved, either by 
plea or verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
EVIDENCE OF MR. FARIAS'S IMMIGRATION STATUS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED 
BECAUSE IT IS NOT RELEVANT. 
The first issue presented is whether the defendant should be permitted to 
introduce evidence as to either victim's immigration status. Specifically, whether the fact 
that Jose Farias is, and was on February 26, 2000, residing in the United States illegally, 
is relevant to the Aggravated Robbery at issue in the instant case. Utah Rule of Evidence 
401 provides that "'relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah Rule of Evidence 
402 provides that "evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Therefore, unless 
the victims' immigration status falls within the definition of relevant evidence, it cannot 
be admitted. 
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Joseph Langi is charged with two counts of Aggravated Robbery. The elements 
of Aggravated Robbery as to Count I are (1) that on or about February 26, 2000, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah; (2) the defendant, Joseph Langi, a party to the offense; (3) 
took personal property in the possession of Jose Farias; (4) from the person or immediate 
presence of Jose Farias; (5) and in the course of committing such robbery caused serious 
bodily injury to Jose Farias. The elements of Count II are identical but for the name of 
the victim. Whether the victims are legal U.S. residents has no tendency to make the 
existence of any fact of consequence any more likely or less likely. It is certainly no 
defense to these charges that the victims were not lawfully present in the United States or 
Utah. In addition, whether the victims were lawfully present has no bearing upon 
whether they had personal property removed from their persons or immediate presence, 
and certainly has no bearing upon the nature or extent of their injuries. Because the 
victims' immigration status has no effect or impact on any element of the offenses 
charged, evidence of that status is not relevant, and is therefore inadmissible. 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM ADMITTING EVIDENCE AS TO 
EITHER VICTIM'S CUSTODY STATUS 
The second issue before the Court is whether defendant should be permitted to 
introduce evidence as to either victim's custody status. Again, as a threshold matter, 
defendant must demonstrate the evidence is relevant. Unless relevant, the evidence is 
inadmissible. 
Victim Jose Farias is currently in custody. He is being detained by United States 
Marshals, having been indicted for an offense based upon his unlawful presence in the 
United States. Mr. Farias's federal matter remains pending. He has not been convicted 
by jury, nor has he entered a plea. Utah Rule of Evidence 609 provides that "evidence 
that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, 
subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year under the law under which the witness was convicted..." Mr. Farias is a pre-
trial detainee - no conviction has been entered. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 609, his 
credibility may not be attacked based upon the pending charge. Moreover, evidence of 
Mr. Farias's custody status is not admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), 
because it is not offered for a non-character purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that its Motion in 
Limine re: Victims' Immigration and Custody Status be granted. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2001. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Sirena M. Wissler 
Deputy District Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of April, 2001, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to be mailed in the 
U.S. Mails, postage prepaid to Paul Gotay, Attorney at Law, 357 South 200 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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Paul Gotay (1224) 
Gotay Law Office 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-533-8373 
Fax: 801-539-5210 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY 
Plaintiff. HEARING 
vs. Case No. 001917415 
JOSEPH MAKA LANGI, 
I Judge Judith Atherton 
Defendant. I 
COMES NOW, the defendant, JOSEPH MAKA LANGI, by and through 
his attorney of record, Paul Gotay, and pursuant to the provisions 
of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure moves the Court 
for an Order granting the defendant a new trial. 
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference is an 
affidavit in support of Motion for New Triai. It is anticipated 
that many more affidavits or live testimony will be offered in 
support of Motion for New Trial. 
The affidavit and live testimony offered in support of the 
Motion for New Trial draw into question the truthfulness of a 
State's key witness against JOSEPH MAKA LANGI, specifically Siasi 
Afu. 
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Siasi Afu was not truthful when he testified at the 
defendant's trial, and his conduct, activities, and statements made 
after the trial are consistent with the view that he was not 
truthful when he testified at JOSEPH MAKA LANGI's trial. 
It is further requested that at the time this matter is 
scheduled for evidentiary hearing that the State produce Siasi Afu 
for the purpose of being examined regarding these issues. 
Respectfully submitted this day of , 2001. 
PAUL GOTAY 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion for New Trial and Request for Evidentiary Hearing was 
[ ] sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid, 
[ ] sent by facsimile transmittal to #: , 
[ J hand-delivered, 
this day of _ , 2001, to: 
Sirena M. Wissler, Esq. 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PAUL GOTAY 
Attorney at Law 
2 
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05/19/01 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
RE: JOSEPH MAKALANGI 
STATEMENT OF FINEEVA MAKA 
My name is Fineeva Maka, and I am Siaosi's friend, I have known him for couple of years here in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. I have talk with Siaosi a couple of times about this case, and he has told me that the 
prosecutor wanted him to testify against Joe as part of his deal and to dismiss his other cases. He also said 
that it was the prosecutor who asked and told him about the stolen items. He did not see Joe took anything 
from the two victim, because he has left the scene to go and pick up the car. He also told me that he has to 
lie to tije investigator, because he was scared and doesn't want to stay in prison. 
The above statement is true and if called to testify, I will testify. 
Sincerely, 
Fineeva Maka 
(801)604-4112 
M*~-+-Ga~~A S-As/o/ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SHANNA DANIELS 
3570 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4119 
Commission Expires 
Jury 15, 2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Paul Gotay (1224) 
Got ay Law Office 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-533-8373 
Fax: 801-539-5210 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
vs, 
JOSEPH MAKA LANGI, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 001917415 
Judge Judith S.H. Atherton 
COMES NOW, the defendant, Joseph Maka Langi, by and through 
his attorney of record, Paul Gotay, and provides the Court with the 
following Memorandum in Support of his Motion for a New Trial. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The defendant, Joseph Maka Langi, was convicted of aggravated 
robbery on June 11, 2001. The State's key witness in that 
prosecution was Langi's co-defendant, Siaosi Afu, who testified 
regarding conversations he had with the defendant, Joseph Maka 
Langi, involving the robbery. The jury, believing that the 
conversations occurred between Joseph Maka Langi and Siaosi Afu 
convicted Joseph Maka Langi of two counts of aggravated robbery. 
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In June of 2001, the defendant re-filed a Motion for a New 
Trial and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, along with an affidavit 
of Siaoai Afu admitting that he lied when testifying at Joseph Maka 
Langifs trial for aggravated robbery. (Exhibit No.l.) Joseph Maka 
Langi, in support of his Motion for a New Trial, also supplies the 
Court with two other affidavits that corroborate Siaosi Afu's 
statement. Exhibits No*2 and No.3 consist of affidavits in which 
Siaosi Afu admits to other third persons that which he states in 
Exhibit No.l. Virtually all of the evidence came to light after 
the trial in that it consisted of statements made by Siaosi Afu 
after the trial. 
DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT CASE LAW 
In 1991, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. James. 819 P. 
2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) . The defendant, Stephen Ray James, was 
convicted of capital murder and received a life sentence resulting 
from the death of his son. During the State's case, the State 
produced a person by the name of Ronald Peterson, who at the time 
was an inmate at the Utah State Prison and who stated that Mr. 
James had confessed to him. Post-trial, James filed a Motion for 
a New Trial on the basis of two pieces of evidence. The second 
piece of evidence was obtained from another person, who was an 
inmate at the Utah State Prison and who stated, apparently in an 
affidavit, that Peterson had told this person (Lisner) that 
Peterson had fabricated his testimony at trial in an attempt to get 
2 
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better treatment from the State at his own criminal trial. The 
Motions were denied by the Trial Court, and the Appeal followed. 
The Supreme Court at 819 P.2d 793 held as follows: 
Additionally, in order to constitute grounds for a 
new trial, evidence must meet three criteria: 
(1) It must be such aB could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and 
produced at the trial; (2) it must not be 
merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to 
render a different result probable on the 
retrial of the case. (Citation omitted)• 
The Supreme Court, in discussing the standards for granting a 
new trial in the State of Utah stated as follows: 
However, the evidence of Peterson's perjury 
stands on a different footing than that 
presented in the first Motion. The evidence 
was not reasonably discoverable before trial. 
Peterson apparently spoke to Kenneth Lisner 
concerning his fabrications to the police 
about two weeks before the trial. He then 
told Lisner that he would not go through with 
the lie at the trial. Lisner only discovered 
that Peterson had, in fact, committed perjury 
by watching news accounts of the trial after 
Peterson had already testified. Lisner did 
not attempt to contact the defendant or his 
attorneys concerning the conversation until 
sometime in June 1989, after the trial, when 
the defendant was placed in the same cell 
block with Lisner* Therefore, Lisner was 
unaware of Peterson's perjury until near the 
conclusion of the trial, and the defendant was 
not aware of Lisner1s knowledge until well 
after the trial... 
The evidence also meets the second criterion 
for newly discovered evidence. The trial 
judge found that Lisner1s testimony would be 
merely cumulative of James' testimony that he 
had never had a conversation with Lippencott. 
The trial judge also based his denial of the 
Motion upon the fact that the testimony to be 
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presented by Lisner went merely to the 
credibility of Peterson and did not present 
new evidence of the defendant's innocence. 
While it is true that the refusal to grant a 
new trial based merely on credibility will 
generally not be overturned on appeal, the 
credibility evidence went beyond refuting the 
testimony of Peterson and established 
independent evidence that he had deliberately 
committed periurv in an attempt to subvert the 
trial process to his own ends. This evidence 
was not merely credibility evidence and was 
not merely cumulative of James1 testimony that 
he had not confessed to Lippencott. Lisner's 
testimony concerned a disputed fact that arose 
between Peterson's testimony and James1, 
whether or not Peterson's testimony concerning 
the overheard confession was truthful. The 
testimony of Lisner would corroborate that of 
James and provide independent evidence of his 
version of the facts* Evidence from a neutral 
third party is not merely cumulative of a 
criminal defendants testimony. It is of a 
different kind and nature than a defendant's 
statements, and it certainly could have a 
different quality in the eyes of the jurors, 
who assess the credibility of the witnesses. 
Regardless of Siaosi Afu's explanation or characterization of 
statements made by him to the trial jury, which call into question 
the truthfulness of his testimony, the fact that he has retracted 
his testimony is not in dispute because of the existence of Exhibit 
No.l, which consists of his own admission. This Court is not 
obligated to pass on the truthfulness of the statements made by 
Siaosi Afu and is certainly not obligated to accept, as true, 
Siaosi Afu's explanation for those statements. There is little 
dispute that Siaosi Afu has made the statements considering that he 
notarized Exhibit No.l. It is for a jury to determine whether or 
not those statements made by Siaosi Afu, clearly impeaching his 
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prior statements made under oath, were false or not. The only way 
that determination can be made is for this Court to grant a new 
trial based upon the existence of these statements and allow a 
fact-finder to pass on that credibility issue. 
The three criteria for granting a new trial have been met. It 
is undisputed that a large portion of the evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing was evidence discovered after the trial. The 
evidence is certainly more than cumulative, because there was no 
independent evidence presented at the trial of Siaosi Afu's 
untruthfulness • The third criteria requires that the evidence must 
be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of 
the case. It is difficult to imagine more important evidence 
affecting a more important witness in this case. It is direct 
testimony and evidence, documentary and otherwise, of Siaosi Afu's 
untruthful testimony at the trial. There is no question that 
Siaosi Afu was the key witness in this case. 
.CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant, Joseph Maka Langi, 
is entitled to have this Court grant his Motion for a New Trial and 
conduct such a trial. 
Respectfully submitted this Lh day of \uuuip 2001, 
PAUL Gerj&Y 
Attorney for 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial was 
[ ] sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid, 
[ ] sent by facsimile transmittal to No*: , 
[ **.] hand-delivered, 
this 2k. day of NftxA^e^ 2001, to: 
Sirena M. Wissler, Esq. 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PAUL 
Attorney at Li 
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May 21,2001 
To Whom It May Concern: 
RE; JOSEPH M. LANGI 
STATEMENT OF SIAOSIAFU 
MY NAME IS SIAOSI AFU AND I AM JOE'S CO-DEFENDER IN THIS CASE. I AM GIVEN THIS 
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF JOE LANGI. 
I AM SORRY TO SAY THAT I HAVE LIED ON THE INVESTIGATOR'S REPORT, BECAUSE IT 
WAS A PART OF OUR DEAL TO TESTIFY AGAINST JOE, AND BECAUSE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR'S PUSHING, AND COACHING QUESTIONS, I HAVE TO LIE. I DID NOT SEE JOE 
TOOK OR STEAL ANYTHING FROM THE 2 VICTIMS, BECAUSE I HAVE LEFT THE SCENE TO 
PltCK UP THE VEHICLE. IT WAS THE INVESTIGATOR THAT ASKED ME AND TOLD ME 
ABOUT THE STOLEN ITEMS, AND ALSO TOLD ME THAT IF I TELL THEM WHAT THEY 
WANTED TO KNOW, THEY WOULD GIVE ME A LIGHTER SENTENCES AND DISMISSED MY 
OTHER CASES. 
I TESTIFY TO THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE AND CORRECT STATEMENT MADE BY ME 
ON THIS 22 DAY OF MAY. 
SINCERELY, 
' / * * / ' / 
NOTARY PUBLTCT ~? 
SHANNA DANIELS j 
3570 South 2700 West I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Commission Expires J 
July 15, 2004 ) 
_ STATE OF UTAH 
SIAOSI AFU 
^ 
-&~7, 
/y Cwy^v^Q— a> 
•y^SX? 
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May20,2001 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Re: Joseph Maka Langi 
I am writing this statement to testify that I have known Siaosi or George in English, for long time and that 
he is my close friend. Siaosi told me that he has to lie in court, because of the prosecutor's pushing, and 
coaching questions. Siaosi said that it was the prosecutor and the investigator who told him about die 
stolen items, but he did not see Joe took or stolen anything from the victims, because he has left first to pick 
up the vehicle. Siaosi also said that he make a deal with die prosecutor that if he testify against Joe, they 
would let him out of prison and dismissed his other cases. 
I testify to the above statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
Sincerely, 
Samuel Misini 
(818)968-8293 j^jL**-tof4--
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05/19/01 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
RE: JOSEPH MAKALANGI 
STATEMENT OF FINEEVA MAKA 
My name is Fineeva Maka, and I am SiaosPs Mend I have known him for couple of years here in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. I have talk with Siaosi a couple of times about this case, and he has told me that the 
prosecutor wanted him to testify against Joe as part of his deal and to dismiss his other cases. He also said 
that it was the prosecutor who asked and told him about die stolen items. He did not see Joe took anything 
from the two victim, because he has left the scene to go and pick up the car. He also told me that he has to 
lie to tfce investigator, because he was scared and doesn't want to stay in prison. 
Hie above statement is true and if called to testify, I will testify. 
Sincerely, 
Fineeva Maka 
(801)604-4112 
i t ^ _ ( W i > *•/«/«/ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SHANNA DANIELS 
3570 South ^ V ^ t 
Salt Laktf City, U*«*> & 4 1 1 9 
Commission Expires 
July 15,2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION UNIT 
INTERVIEWEE: SIAOSIAFU (George) 
SUBJECT: JOSEPH MAKA LANGI 
DATE: 
CASE No: 
RE: 
JULY 18,2001 
2001-893 
PERJURY 
Okay today's date is July 18th year 2001. Time right now is 10:30 hours. This is 
a meeting with Defense Attorney David Biggs and his client Siaosi, spelling, S-I-A-O-S-
L 
KJ: You go by the name of Geoi^e? 
S A: George Yeah. 
KJ: Afa, A-F-U. This meeting is being held at the District Attorney's office, 231 east 
400 south, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DB: Before we begin I wanted maybe to uh, well short circuit this a little bit I told my 
client that he is under investigation for perjury since that is what Sirena Wissler 
indicated to me. Just as a general statement, "Before we begin, George wants you 
to know that the following are the facts in this case, having to do with the Perjury 
allegation. Number one; George doesn't read. George never read this document 
that he signed. That's number one. Number two; it was never read to him 
Verbatim by anyone. It was basically, distracted for him by his wife and then he 
signed it but he never read it, cant read and didn't read it Um, Number three; he 
never lied under oath. Number four: he did lie to the investigating officer initially 
that only having to do with his participation. And that's what his wife told him 
this thing said, that his wife said that two things this document said, one, that he 
initially lied to the investigating officer which is accurate. But then he told the 
truth. Second she said that this document said that he never saw his two co-
defendants actually take anything from the two victims. And that is true, he 
didn't see that he was out getting the car in the car leaving but he did tell the 
investigator that the gentleman in the back seat and I apologize I don't know 
which co-defendant that is, showed him some bloody money and said do you 
want some of this. And he said no. And so the document is incorrect when he 
says that he, or infers that he lied on the stand, he did not do that. It's incorrect or 
inaccurate when it indicates that he lied to the investigating officer concerning his 
sore testimony. He didn't do that either. And lastly he wants everyone to know 
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that Sirena Wissler did not coach him, and did not push him and did not threaten 
him to testify in any particular way, that just did not happened. And he 
apologizes to Mrs. Wissler and to the prosecution if he could read, he would have 
read it if he... 
S A: Yeah I would have never signed anything like that saying that I lied under oath 
cause I didn't lie under oath. 
KJ: And that's what the impression was when I read it. After reading the motion, the 
motion does not, this memorandum does not even really compare to the statement 
on this paper for one thing and I wanted to go through a series of questions and 
talk to you about those. 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: And how they relate okay? 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: And I talked to Deputy District attorney Sirena Wissler about picking this apart 
because in my opinion, it is not accurate of what you even signed okay? 
SAt Okay. 
KJ: What he is suggesting to the court you did okay. 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: And she didn't have a chance to really thoroughly read this, but I believe its all 
gonna come, the truth is gonna come out in our little interview here today. 
SA: 
KJ 
SA; 
KJ 
SA 
KJ 
SA: 
Okay. 
Okay. And I that is what I want to stress, I want to stress truthfulness here. 
Okay. 
And that will all come to light okay? 
Okay. 
Because Mr. Gotay is accusing you of perjury okay? 
Okay. 
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KJ: Doesn't necessarily mean that we are accusing you of that okay? But that is what 
he is accusing you of okay? But because he is accusing you of that, I have to 
investigate because you were a witness for the state, Okay. 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: Does that make sense? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Okay. But since you are being accused of that, I need to read your Miranda 
warnings okay? Even thought you are being represented by your attorney here 
okay you have legal counsel here I'm still going to read you Miranda warnings 
okay? 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: And that, that we just want the truth okay? 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: And at any time you don't need to answer or Mr. Biggs can step in and tell me so, 
okay? 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: All right listen carefully. You have the right to remain silent anything you say 
can and will be used against you in court. You have the right to consult to a 
lawyer before answering any questions and to have a lawyer with you during any 
questioning. If you can't afford a lawyer one will be provided for you free of cost 
as you, it you want one, as you well know. Do you understand your rights as I 
have explained them? 
SA: Yes. 
KJ: Okay. And you are here with legal counsel right now and you are willing to talk 
with me about this? 
SA: Yes sir. 
KJ: Okay. And I appreciate your summary of Mr. Afii's statement from the very start 
Mr. Biggs. I believe we are all on about the same page here. But we want to get 
it down because she has to prepare a response to his memorandum, as you well 
know. Okay now let me start with the very first the letter that you have in front of 
you is marked exhibit one and it's urn, I'm gonna read it for the record. It says it 
has a date at the top it says May 21,2001. To whom it may concern; and then it 
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says, re, reference Joseph M. Langi statement of Siaosi Afu. It says, "My name is 
Siaosi Afu I am Joe's co-defender in this case. I am giving this statement on 
behalf of Joe Langi. I am sorry to say that I have lied on the investigators report 
because it was a part of our deal to testify against Joe. And because of the 
prosecutor's pushing and coaching questions, I have to lie. I did not see Joe took 
or steal anything from the two victims, because I have left the scene to pick up the 
vehicle. It was the investigator that asked me and told me about the stolen items, 
and also told me that if I tell them what they wanted to know, they would give me 
a lighter sentences and dismiss my other cases. I testified that the above 
statement is true and correct statement made by me on this 22 day of May. 
Sincerely Siaosi Afu. And then there is a signature in cursive it looks like it's 
George Afu and thai there is another signature in cursive says Shanna Daniels. 
With the date 5/23/01 and written and then there is Shanna Daniel notary republic 
stamp on the bottom of the letter. As Mr. Biggs has already stated, you cannot 
read, is that correct? 
SA: I can read a little bit but I can't read big words. 
KJ: Do you remember seeing this letter in front of you? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Was it notarized in front of you? 
SA: Yes. 
KJ: Okay Um, who prepared the letter? Who actually typed this out? 
SA: I don't even know. 
KJ: Who's idea was this letter? 
S A: It was brought to me by my friend his name is Sam. 
KJ: A friend Sam, what is his last name. 
SA: M-I... 
KJ: M-I? 
SA: S-I... 
KJ: S-I? 
SA: N-I. 
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KJ: N-I? 
SA: Misini. 
KJ: And when your friend Sam brought this to you, 
SA: Yes. 
KJ: Atyourhouse? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Why did he say he was bringing it to you? 
SA: To sign it 
KJ: Okay what for, to help Joseph? 
SA: To help Joe yeah. 
KJ: To help Joe get out of the bad sentencing he had gotten right? 
SA: Yeah. I think he's, yeah. 
KJ: Cause he was convicted in trial? 
SA: Yeah. Well we didn't really talk about he just brought it and told me, "Hey this 
the thing to help out Joe. 
KJ: Okay. 
SA: Anduh... 
KJ: You want to help out Joe and he's a friend? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: And you don't have no hard feelings towards him or anything like that? You did 
not understand the letter and what it really said at the time that you signed it? 
SA: No, no I didn't, I thought that the letter meant that I lied to the detectives when I 
got interviewed and that was what my wife told me. 
KJ: So when Sam Misini brought it over, he said this is to help Joe? 
SA: No. 
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KJ: And you kind of looked it over but you didn't really understand it? 
S A: Well I took it, well my wife; I gave it to my wife. 
KJ: And did your wife read it to you? 
SA: Yeah she read it and then she told me that and I asked her if there was anything 
that would get me into trouble and she said she didn't think so but she didn't 
know for sure though. 
KJ: Did Sam say that it was from Mr. Gotay? That Mr. Gotay... 
SA: No I don't even think he knew where it came he came from L.A. 
KJ: Okay so Sam didn't tell you that Joe's attorney that he had got it from Joe's 
attorney? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Okay. And at the time that Sam showed this to you, Mr. Biggs vras not notified, 
you did not call Mr. Biggs? 
SA: Oh no. 
KJ: And ask him about it or anything right? 
SA: No. 
KJ: And Sam didn't tell you that you had the right to talk to your attorney before... 
SA: No. 
KJ: You looked it over and signed it did he? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Okay. So nobody told you that you had the right to legal representation before 
signing the letter such as this? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Are you aware that you do? 
SA: Yeah, I had known when he called me and told me that. 
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KJ: Yeah the best thing you could have done at that point was to call Mr. Biggs when 
Sam showed up with this letter and read it to him even over the phone. 
SA: Okay. 
DB: That would have been the best thing to do. Just to clarify George, Your wife read 
it, but she didn't read it to you she just read it and said this is what it says, 
correct? 
SA: Yeah. 
DB: She didn't read it what is called verbatim she didn't read it to you she just read it 
and said this is what it say's right? 
SA: Yeah that is right 
KJ: So she didn't read it out loud to you? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Okay. 
SA: I just asked her to read it and then I took off and then I came back and she told me 
what was going on with it 
DB: Was this Shannon Daniels? Did you go somewhere to sign it where Shannon 
Daniels was? 
SA: Yeah. 
DB 
KJ 
SA 
KJ 
SA 
KJ 
SA 
KJ 
Okay. 
Is this the address where you went at 3570 south 2700 west? 
Uhyeah. 
In West Valley? 
Right next to uh, West Valley Police. 
West Valley Police? 
Yeah. 
Okay and you went with Sam to get the stamp put on it? 
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SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Okay let me talk to you about, a little bit about urn, what Mr. Biggs has said, you 
told the investigator and also you know what I know from reading the interview 
with the investigator and what I also know as what you testified to on the stand 
okay? 
SA: Okay: 
KJ: Urn, I couldn't see anywhere on the investigators interview with you that you lied 
about anything to be honest with you? 
SA: Uh-huh. 
KJ: Okay. You mentioned that you did lie to the investigator but I couian t see wnere 
you did okay so if you can try to explain to me where do you think you lied to the 
investigator? 
SA: Well I got, see the thing was, when we first got caught... 
KJ: Uh-huh. 
SA: I never thought Joe would get caught so when we interviewed with the 
investigator, I told the investigator I put everything on Joe. 
KJ: Uh-huh. 
SA: So when there was, you know when he asked about wallets I was like, "Yeah he 
took them and... 
KJ: Uh-huh. 
SA: And he asked me where I, where he threw them and I told him see the whole 
statement about Joe was all incorrect cause I knew Joe. I told him, the 
investigator that I had dropped Joe off across the street from some church and I 
never did that. There was a lot of things that had to do with Joe that I didn't tell 
the investigator cause I never thought that they would catch Joe and when they 
did catch Joe, they found out then that I was, that Joe knew, that Joe knew me the 
whole time that they thought that this was going on they, when they caught Joe 
they thought that Joe knew (Inaudible) the other defendant. 
KJ: Right. 
S A: But the whole time Joe was, Joe knew me that's how Joe got, ended up with us. 
KJ: So you lied about your relationship to Joe? 
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SA: Yeah. 
KJ: But you didn't, you didn't, that had nothing to do with the crime itself as far as... 
SA: No. 
KJ: Who did what in the crime? 
SA: Oh no, no, no. 
KJ: And as far as a wallet goes, you were telling the truth when you uh, told the 
investigator and testified on the stand that you never saw who took the wallets? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: But you in the interview, you test, you told the investigator you saw Joseph pitch 
the wallet out the window by the Methodist church? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Do you remember telling them that? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: You testified truthfully and you told the investigator truthfully that you did not 
see who took the wallet at the time of the assault cause you'd already walked 
outside to get a car? 
SA: Yeah,yeah. 
KJ: Okay. So the only lying you did to the detective was just your relationship with 
Joe? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: How well you knew Joe? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: But not about the crime itself? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Also during the interview with the detectives urn, they never offered you any kind 
of deal is that correct? 
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SA: No they didn't 
KJ: Yeah. So they never offered, you a deal that if you testified against Joe Langi 
down the road or that you're going to get a better deal out of this, is that correct? 
SA: That's correct 
DB: May I also add that in our discussions together that there was never any indication 
of that? Uh, at all that it would affect his sentencing what so ever. 
SA: That's correct 
DB: But I did indicate that it certainly might ifuh, if he were honest and forthright 
That always is a helpful thing for a person to do when the Adult Probation and 
Parole presentence is prepared. If the presentence people believe that you are 
now being honest and truthful with them and you participation in the crime their 
much more willing to work with you as a probation. 
KJ: So in all reality you did not lie about anything to the investigator about the crime 
itself? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Or to or to the state when you were witness on the stand is that correct? 
SA: Oh I did not lie on the stand at all. The only time I lied was when I first got 
caught and I was talking to the investigators. 
KJ: And you more or less minimized your relationship with Joe? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: You didn't tell them the whole... 
SA: Story about Joe. 
KJ: Story about how well you knew Joe? 
SA: No. 
KJ: But you did see him throw that wallet out the window by the Methodist church? 
S A: I seen, I seen him with money I can't, I don't even remember what I said back 
then about the... 
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KJ: I, I understand it has been quite awhile. 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: I will refer back to page 24 of the interview with Detective Jeff Lone. He asked, I 
will just mention a few statements on this interview. He says's, "Who had the 
wallets." This is Jeff Lone talking he said, "Who had the wallets and threw out?" 
Do you remember where and then you repeat, you answer, "Joe that Joe dude and 
you're referring to Joe Langi right? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: And he says, "Cause they these guys you know they had their green cards in 
them, all their personal papers and stuff." That's Jeff Lone then your answer is, 
"Uh yeah, he threw out right on the street right when we were driving right on 54, 
you know what I mean cause we never went9" And then there is some inaudible 
conversation and then uh, he asks, Jeff Lone asks you, "Let him out at the church" 
SA: That was a lie. 
KJ: Was that a lie? 
SA* Yeah. 
KJ: So there was little bits and pieces of where you lied to the... 
SA: Yeah cause see I never let him out at the church. I took; he slept over at my house 
that night 
KJ: So that is what you're referring to? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Is little bits and pieces about where you let Joe out because you were firiends with 
Joe? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: And you didn't want Joe to get in to trouble at that time? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Right. 
SA: Yeah. 
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KJ: Okay. So he slept at your house that night? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Any, can you think of any questions asked by you on the witness stand by either 
urn, the prosecutor Sirena Wissler or the defense attorney Mr. Gotay, that you 
were untruthful about? Was there anything on there that you migfat have lied 
about during the trial of Joseph Langi? 
SA: You know what to tell you the truth, I don't I don't think I did. 
KJ: Uh-huh. 
SA: But you know I have been to trial so many times you know and they ask, you 
know they I don't know, I have never been in courtrooms before and the way they 
ask their questions is sometimes you know they spin them around and one person 
will ask one thing and I don't, I just don't understand what they ask and that's just 
the plain, you know that's just the truth of it Of sometimes I will say "yes" and 
they'll say, "But you stated this day before, this day that you did." And I would 
be like, "Well I guess then that's what I did then." But I don't, I don't, I've been 
in court so many times that I don't even know you know what's truth and what's 
not truth any more. 
KJ: I know that some of those questions can get extremely confusing. 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Um, but, George what I am asking is, urn, as far as you being truthful? 
SA: Uh-huh. 
KJ: Um, when it came to any fact about the crime itself? 
SA: Uh-huh. 
KJ: In your mind, you are not distorting the facts or trying to change what actually 
happened? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Were you trying to be totally truthful at all times? 
SA: Oh yeah. 
KJ: Even when during confusing questions? 
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Oh yeah, oh yeah. 
Urn, at that point, there was no reason to lie about anything right? 
No. 
Uh, initially... 
Once they caught Joe, there was no reason to lie about anything. 
Right so you never intentionally lied on the stand? 
No I never lied on the stand. 
You were extremely truthful at all times? 
Yes I was. 
Okay. That, that's the whole point of this interview today. 
Okay. 
{s because uh, in the memorandum sent to the sent to our office, requesting a 
motion for a new trial, your being accused of lying on the stand 
SA: No I never... 
And at no time did you lie on the stand? 
No way. 
KJ: You did not give the whole truth to the investigator about your relationship with 
Joe? 
SA: Yes. 
KJ: But you did not lie even about the crime that occurred? 
SA: No. 
KJ: You told the truth about the crime from the start, from the time you went into 
Beta's... 
SA: Yes I did 
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KJ: And confronted the two individuals um or, you just confronted the one individual 
basically um, initially because of the, their staring problem? 
SA: Uh-huh. 
KJ 
SA 
And fear of a gun and things like that And that all came out in trial okay? 
Yeah. 
KJ: And, and we want, we wanted the truth from the start and, and you gave the truth, 
is that correct? 
SA: Yes sir. 
KJ: Okay um, because your probably gonna have to be called upon to testify if their is 
a motion for a new trial with the judge and that's gonna be what your gonna be 
asked to testify to is your truthfulness. 
SA: Okay. 
KJ: Okay. Um, 
DB: George, Sirena Wissler never asked you to lie did she? 
SA: No she didn't 
KJ: And Kevin Judd never asked you to lie, did he? 
SA: I don't know who Kevin Judd is? 
KJ: I'm Keyb Judd. I never disked you to lie, is that correct? 
SA: No, no. 
KJ: Detective Jeff Lone never asked you to lie is that correct? 
SA: No he didn't 
KJ: Okay. Mr. Biggs touched on a point about this letter also. Um, it refers to the 
prosecutors pushing and coaching questions did Sirena Wissler or Mark Kouris 
the previous prosecutor, did they ever push you or coach you into saying a certain 
statement about what happened? 
SA: No. 
KJ: They did not? 
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SA: No they didn't 
KJ: Okay you remember Marie Kouris he was the previous prosecutor? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Okay cause that is, that is one of the statements that is on this letter that you 
signed and that's, that's an important... 
DB: I can also state for the record that was always present with Mr. Kouris or Mrs. 
Wissler when they spoke to George and I never witnessed anything of that nature 
(Inaudible) 
KJ: Very good. Can you think of anything Mr. Biggs that I might be forgetting to ask 
ofuh,Mr.Afii? 
DB: No I think you covered i t 
KJ: Let me look over my notes briefly bare with me. As far as back to the reference 
of lying to the investigator, can you think of anything else that you might have 
lied about other than uh, your relationship with Joe? 
SA: No. 
KJ: And uh, letting him out of the church that night? 
SA: No. 
KJ: He slept fit your house rather than let him out at the church and also... 
SA: Anything that has to do with that 
KJ: You didn't want the detective to know how close you actually were tb Joseph at 
that point? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Okay. And at no time when you were under oath, when you gave that statement 
to that investigator, is that correct? 
SA: Yeah. 
KJ: Under oath is when you, as you raised your hand on the stand, on the witness 
stand, that is an oath. 
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SA: Yeah. 
KJ: And they didn't ask you to take an oath when you uh, met with Ihem and gave 
them a statement? 
SA: No. 
KJ: Okay. I think that is about it Mr. Biggs? 
DB: That's fine. 
KJ: All right. This will terminate the interview with um, Mr. George Afu and his 
attorney, David Biggs. Time right now is 11:00 on July 18th 
SERGEANT KEVIN JUDD 
Date: July 18,2001 
Typed by: fib 
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SIRENA M. WISSLER (7450) 
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231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSEPHMAKALANGL 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
Case No. 001907415 
Hon. Judith S. Atherton 
• • tmmi^mtwww IIMJII II • 
The State of Utah, by and through its attorneys David E. Yocom, District 
Attorney for Salt Lake County, and Sirena M. Wissler, Deputy District Attorney, submits 
this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about February 26,2000, Jose Farias and Gabriel CalviUo were attacked 
by three persons at Beta's Restaurant in Keams, Utah. Beta's Restaurant was 
equipped with surveillance cameras, which captured and recorded the attacks. 
2. Jose Farias and Gabriel CalviUo were accompanied by Rachel Redding at the 
time they were attacked. Ms. Redding was not injured. 
3. Defendant Joseph Langi was identified as one of the three persons who 
attacked Farias and CalviUo as Redding looked on. 
COPY 
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4. Defendant Langi has not denied being present and participating in the attacks 
on Farias and Calvillo. He claims, however, that he committed only assaults, 
and not robberies. 
5. During defendant's trial in April, 2001, Farias and Calvillo testified as to their 
recollections of the events of February 26, 2000. Redding also testified as to 
what she had observed as she watched from a few feet away. 
6. The State admitted into evidence (without objection by the defense) a 
videotape, which depicted the attacks. That video shows defendant Langi 
searching through the pockets of the unconscious victims, although it is 
unclear from the video whether any property was actually removed from 
either man. 
7. Farias testified that he had been wearing an eyebrow ring;, which had been 
removed from him during the assault. Calvillo testified that his wallet, which 
had been in his pocket and which contained money, had been removed from 
him and was not in his pocket when he looked for it at the hospital. 
8. Siaosi "George" Afu, one of the three people responsible for the attacks on 
Farias and Calvillo, testified at Langi's trial. He identified Langi as a 
participant, and also testified that after he had rendered Calvillo unconscious, 
he fled the restaurant to retrieve the car. He further indicated that, because he 
had left to go get the car, he did not actually see the defendant take or attempt 
to take anything from either victim. 
9. Afu did testify, however, that when defendant Langi entered the car, Afu 
observed that he had money in his hand and that the money had blood on it. 
10. Following two hours of deliberation, the jury empanelled in the above-
captioned matter returned verdicts of guilty on two counts of Aggravated 
Robbery, each subject to enhanced penalties by virtue of the fact that the jury 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had acted in concert with 
two or more persons. 
11. Defendant then timely filed a motion for new trial, in which defendant 
claimed that he is entitled to a new trial because co-defendant Siaosi "George" 
Afu gave perjured testimony at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE HIS TRIAL DID 
NOT CONTAIN ANY ERROR OR IMPROPRIETY. WHICH HAD A SUBSTANTIAL 
ADVERSE EFFECT UPON DEFENDANTS RIGHTS. 
The sole issue presented before this Court is whether defendant is entitled to a 
new trial. The issue is, of course, governed by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24, 
which provides that a trial court 
may, uppn motion of any party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety, which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
Among the grounds for new trial are jury misconduct (see State v. Durand, 569 P. 2d 
Utah 1977)), prosecutorial misconduct (see State v. Owens, 753 P. 2d 976 (Utah App. 
1988)), sufficiency of evidence (see State v. BeBee, 195 P. 2d 746 (Utah 1948), and 
newly discovered evidence (see State v. Conrad, 590 P. 2d 1264 (Utah 1979); State v. 
Williams, 712 P. 2d 220 (Utah 1985)). If present, and if determined to have affected the 
substantial rights of a party, any of these improprieties may stand as cause to grant a new 
trial. In his motion, defendant does not explicitly indicate under which of these theories 
he believes he is entitled to a new trial. However, it appears as though he relies upon the 
notion that he is currently in possession of some newly discovered evidence that calls into 
question his guilt. Specifically, defendant asserts that co-defendant Siaosi "George" Afu 
gave perjured testimony at trial. Not only does he allege that Afu peirjured himself, but 
further alleges that he admits to having done so. (See Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for New Trial, hereafter 'Defendant's Memorandum," pages 2,4,5). 
II. DEFENDANT IS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS 
CURRENTLY IN POSSESSION OF ANY NEWLY DISCOVERED 
EVIDENCE THAT WOULD ENTITLE HIM TO A NEW TRIAL. 
In determining whether defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon newly 
discovered evidence, this Court should be guided by the principles most recently set forth 
in State v. Boyd, 25 P. 3d 985 (Utah 2001). In Boyd, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the appropriate analysis to be conducted in reviewing a motion for new trial based upon 
alleged newly discovered evidence. The Court explained 
The legal standard to be applied when considering a motion for a new 
trial based on newly-discovered evidence is that the moving party must 
show that the evidence satisfies the following factors: (i) it could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial; (ii) it 
is not merely cumulative; and (iii) it must make a different result probable 
on retrial. 
Boyd, K27. Defendant correctly cites State v. James, 819 P. 2d 781 (Utah 1991) for the 
proposition that where it is alleged that a new trial must be granted based upon the 
perjury of a State's witness, the analysis is essentially the same. However, for the 
reasons more fully articulated below, the State submits that State v. James is inapplicable 
to the instant case. 
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a. DEFENDANT MISCHARACTERIZES THE AFFIDAVIT OF SIAOSIAFU 
In support of his motion for new trial, defendant asserts that the affidavit of Siaosi 
Afu, attached to defendant's memorandum as Exhibit 1, contains statements "admitting 
that he lied when testifying at Joseph Maka Langi's trial for aggravated robbery." 
(Defendant's Memorandum at page 2). However, a closer reading of the affidavit of 
Siaosi Afu reveals otherwise. In the affidavit, Siaosi Afu indicates that he "lied on the 
investigator's report." See Exhibit 1, attached to Defendant's Memorandum. Nowhere 
in that affidavit does Siaosi Afu admit that he lied under oath. Moreover, Siaosi Afu was 
cross examined at Joseph Langi's trial, and during that cross examination, he admitted 
that he had given statements to police that were inconsistent with his testimony at trial. 
He ultimately even admitted to the jury that he had lied to detectives. On redirect, 
however, he indicated that during the time he was interviewed by detectives, he was 
never placed under oath, unlike the trial where he swore under penalty of perjury to tell 
the truth. 
b. SIAOSI AFU TESTIFIED TRUTHFULLY AT TRIAL. 
What remains to be determined is whether there is any evidence tending to establish 
that Siaosi Afu testified untruthfully at Joseph Langi's trial. Unless defendant can 
demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction that there is some reason to suspect that Afu 
perjured himself, defendant is left without a basis for new trial. In investigating the 
allegations made by defendant that Afu had perjured himself, Sergeant Kevin Judd of the 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office contacted Afu's attorney, David Biggs of 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders' Association. Sergeant Judd then arranged to conduct and did 
conduct an interview of Siaosi Afu, a transcript of which is attached hereto as State's 
Exhibit A. David Biggs was present during the entire interview, and Aiu was read his 
Miranda rights, having been informed that he was under investigation for perjury. At the 
outset of the interview, David Biggs made the shocking revelation that his client, Siaosi 
Afu, is unable to read. (See Exhibit A, page 1). Siaosi Aiu confirmed tlhat he "can read a 
little bit but I can't read big words." (Exhibit A, page 4). Afu went on to explain that 
Sam Misini, an uncle to defendant Joseph Langi, had come to Aiu's home and presented 
him with an affidavit, asking him to sign it to "help Joe." (Exhibit A, pages 4-6). Misini 
never told Afu that he could talk to an attorney before signing the affidavit (Exhibit A, 
page 6).1 Afu, being unable to read, gave the affidavit to his wife, who looked over it and 
summarized it for Afu, telling him what she believed it said. (Exhibit A, pages 6*7). Afu 
never read the affidavit himself, nor did he have it read to him word for word. (Exhibit 
A, page 7). When he signed the affidavit, Afu thought it meant that he had lied to the 
detectives when he was first interviewed shortly after the crime. (Exhibit A, page 5). 
While his attorney was explaining Siaosi's difficulties reading the affidavit, Siaosi Afu 
interrupted and indicated that he "would never have signed anything like that saying that 
I lied under oath cause I didn't lie under oath." (Exhibit A, page 2).2 
During his interview with Sergeant Kevin Judd, Siaosi Afu was asked about how he 
had lied to investigators when he was first arrested. (Exhibit A, page 8). He indicated 
1
 Interestingly enough, Samuel Misini is the very person who purportedly authored defendant's Exhibit 2, 
an affidavit in which Misini claims to have information relative to Siaosi Aiu's alleged perjury. Misini's 
affidavit is suspiciously similar to the affidavit presented to Siaosi Afu for his signature. Conspicuously 
absent from Misini's affidavit is any acknowledgement that he is related to the defendant in this case, 
Joseph Langi. The Misini affidavit is neither sworn nor notarized 
2
 As further indication of Siaosi Afu's confusion relative to the affidavit, both he and his attorney took 
pains to clarify that Afu had never been coached, pushed, or threatened about testifying or about the 
substance of his testimony. (Exhibit A, pages 2,14-15). Moreover, Afu's attorney indicated that he had 
been present during the State's discussions with Afu, and had never witnessed any undue influence on die 
part of the State's attorneys. (Exhibit A, page 15). Clearly, Afu had no knowledge that the affidavit he 
signed contained allegations of impropriety on the part of State prosecutors. 
that he had lied about the nature and extent of his relationship to Joseph Langi, and about 
where he had dropped Joseph Langi off after the crime had been committed (Exhibit A, 
page 8, 9, 11). Afu, however, steadfastly denied that he had ever lied to investigators 
about the specifics of the actual crime itself, or any participant's relative involvement in 
it (Exhibit A, page 9,10). Most importantly, Afu categorically insisted "I never lied on 
the stand." (Exhibit A, page 13). When asked again whether he had been untruthful 
during Josqph Langi's trial, Afii answered 4CNo way." (Exhibit A, page 13). 
It is apparent that the affidavit of Siaosi Afu, attached to Defendant's 
Memorandum as defendant's Exhibit 1, does not stand for the notion that Afu committed 
perjury during Joseph Langi's trial. At best, it demonstrates that Afu had been untruthful 
to police investigator Jeff Lone during his interview shortly after the offense was 
committed. Afu himself admitted at Langi's trial that he had been dishonest with J2fi£ 
Lone about certain things. He acknowledged that he was dishonest about his relationship 
to Joseph Langi, and about some details of what had gone on in the moments 
immediately after the crime. These facts, however, simply cannot qualify as "newly 
discovered evidence" for one very simple reason - they are all facts known to the 
defendant at the time of trial. Surely defendant cannot reasonably argue that he did not 
know how long Siaosi Afu had known him prior to the night of February 26, 2000, 
because it was precisely the same amount of time that Langi had known Afu. Moreover, 
Langi knew full well about the moments after the crime, because he himself was in that 
car. Not only could the defendant have discovered this information with the exercise of 
due diligence, defendant actually knew this information prior to trial. 
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Because Siaosi Afu categorically denies having testified untruthfully at Joseph 
Langi's trial, and because there is no independent evidence establishing that Siaosi Afu 
committed perjury, there is no newly discovered evidence before this Court upon which it 
could grant defendant's motion for new trial. 
IE. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE 
ASSUMING. ARGUENDO. THAT THERE EXISTS SOME NEWLY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. THAT NEW EVIDENCE WOULD NOT 
MAKE A DIFFERENT RESULT PROBABLE AT RETRIAL. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court is satisfied that Siaosi AfiTs affidavit amounts to 
evidence which could not have been discovered prior to trial in the exercise of due 
diligence, this Court must then determine whether this new evidence is likely to produce 
a different result were a new trial granted. Defendant asserts, without argument or 
support from any source, that Siaosi Afu was 'the State's key witness." (Defendant's 
Memorandum, page 1). He recounts Afu's testimony regarding certain conversations, 
which occurred between Afu and defendant Langi in the moments after they had 
committed a crime together. Defendant then asserts that "the jury, believing that the 
conversations occurred between Joseph Maka Langi and Siaosi Afu convicted Joseph 
Maka Langi of two counts of aggravated robbery." (Defendant's Memorandum, page 1). 
The State is at a loss to explain how the defendant can presume to know what the jury 
believed in arriving at its verdict. Defendant certainly does not attach any affidavit of 
any juror indicating what may have occurred during deliberation, and indeed such 
affidavits would be impermissible pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 606.3 In either 
3
 Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides that Ma juror may not testify as to any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to die effect of anything upon that or any other 
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith," except under certain carefully delineated 
exceptions, none of which have been alleged in the instant case. 
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event, the State disputes defendant's characterization of Siaosi Afu as a "key witness," 
and asserts that even without Siaosi Afu's testimony, the State had presented sufficient 
evidence against defendant to secure his conviction on two counts of Aggravated 
Robbery. 
At defendant's trial, both Jose Farias and Gabriel Calvillo testified as to their 
recollections of what occurred at Beto's Restaurant on February 26, 2000. Their 
companion, Rachel Redding, also testified, as did Deputy Jason Huggard and Detective 
Lone, both of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office. Without question, the critical piece 
of evidence in the State's case was a videotape, which had captured the events that 
ultimately became the subject of the trial. The videotape was admitted without objection 
by the defense, and was authenticated by Rachel Redding as truly and accurately 
depicting the events of February 26,2000. That videotape, as the Court will likely recall, 
captured in ghastly detail the attacks on Jose Farias and Gabriel Calvillo, including 
defendant searching through both victims' pockets as they lay unconscious on the floor of 
Beto's. The victims and Rachel Redding offered testimony pertaining to the removal of 
Farias's eyebrow ring, and the taking of Calvillo's wallet. The only testimony that Siaosi 
Afu offered in support of the State's robbery allegation was that after the incident, in the 
car, he observed defendant Langi in possession of money that had blood on it. Afu stands 
by that statement and indicated (as previously outlined) that he was absolutely truthful at 
trial in that regard. However, even assuming that he was less than truthful, the testimony 
of Farias, Calvillo, Redding and the videotape provide more than enough evidence to 
support defendant's conviction of Aggravated Robbery. 
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Defendant asserts, without argument, that "it is difficult to imagine more 
important evidence afifecting a more important witness in this case." (Defendant's 
Memorandum, page 5). To the contrary - Siaosi Afu's testimony at trial did little more 
than provide drama when Afii pointed to defendant Langi and told the jury that indeed, it 
was Langi who had participated in the savage beatings at Beta's Restaurant on February 
26, 2000, a fact that Langi readily conceded at trial. Identification was never an issue 
during defendant's trial. As early as opening statement, defendant conceded his presence 
at Beto's on February 26, and acknowledged involvement in beating Farias and Calvillo. 
In short, even assuming that this Court were to find that the affidavit recently signed by 
Siaosi Afu, an affidavit which he obviously misunderstood, amounts to newly discovered 
evidence, defendant is simply unable to demonstrate that this evidence would likely cause 
a different result in the event of a retrial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's Motion for 
New Trial be denied. 
DATED this 23* day of July, 2001. 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
SirenaMWissler 
Deputy District Attorney 
.Jti 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New Trial to be 
mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to: Paul Gotay, Attorney for Defendant Joseph 
Maka Langi, 357 South 200 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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CASE NO. 001917415 
MOTION HEARING 
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SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
SEPTEMBER 07, 2001 
REPORTED BY: TEENA GREEN, CSR, RPR 
238-7104 
simply indicate that I think itfs inappropriate at this point 
in time for the defendant to now request that we conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, when during the initial stages of this 
motion the defendant specifically indicated that he did not 
believe that witnesses would be necessary. 
That having been said, Judge, the issue really comes 
down to whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial based 
upon the rule, which is Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 
which governs new trials, and the defendant, quite frankly, has 
not come close to the burden that he bears in terms of the new 
trial. 
Your Honor, the State's position is that the 
affidavit of George Afu, even on its face, does not indicate 
that he committed perjury at trial; in fact, to the contrary. 
What it says is that he lied to the investigators. Well, the 
State concedes that he lied to investigators, he told the jury 
that he lied to investigators. He told the jury that he had 
lied about certain things that he was interviewed about by 
Detective Jeff Lund. Those are things that were known to the 
defendant at the time of trial, they cannot amount to newly 
discovered evidence. That having been said, the defendant is 
not entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered 
evidence. 
There is no other allegation, as far as I'm aware, of 
what could be considered newly discovered evidence. There's 
9 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
SIRENA M. WISSLER, Bar No. 7450 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSEPH LANGI, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
Case No. 001917415 
Hon. Judith S. Atherton 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial came before the Court for argument on 
September 7, 2001 at 2:00 pm. The defendant was not present, having been transported 
to the Utah State Prison unbeknownst to the Court and counsel. However, defendant's 
counsel, Paul Gotay, was present and requested that the motion be heard despite the 
defendant's absence. The State was present and represented by Sirena M. Wissler, 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. The Court, having presided over the trial, 
reviewed the memoranda submitted by each party, and heard oral argument, hereby 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
A HA 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was charged with two counts of Aggravated Robbery, both First 
Degree Felonies, following an incident that occurred at Beto's restaurant on 
February 26, 2000. Both counts of Aggravated Robbery carried group 
enhancements, as it was alleged that in committing the offenses, defendant 
acted in concert with two or more persons. 
2. Defendant was represented by Paul Gotay, who promptly filed both a Notice 
of Appearance of Counsel and Request for Discovery. 
3. The State promptly responded to defendant's Request for Discovery and 
provided, among other things, a transcript of an interview conducted with 
George "Siaosi" Afu. 
4. Co-defendant Konai Bloomfield had already been convicted by a jury of two 
counts of Aggravated Robbery with group enhancements. The other co-
defendant, Siaosi "George" Afu (hereafter "George Afu"), was offered a plea 
bargain. He pled guilty to one count of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree 
Felony, in exchange for his agreement to testify against Bloomfield and 
Langi. 
5. Defendant Langi was tried before a jury beginning on April 25, 2001. 
6. During the defendant's trial, the State introduced as evidence a videotape of 
the events that occurred at Beto's restaurant February 26, 2001. 
7. Defendant did not object to the admission of the videotape. Rather, 
defendant utilized the videotape, arguing at trial that the videotape showed 
that while the victims were certainly beaten, they were not robbed. 
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8. As part of its case-in-chief, the State called George Afu to testify, who 
testified under oath as to the events of February 26, 2000, and his role in the 
events that occurred at Beto's on that night. 
9. Defendant had been notified well in advance of trial that the State intended to 
call George Afu as a witness as part of its case-in-chief. 
10. During his testimony, Afu admitted that when police initially interviewed 
him, he was untruthful about his relationship with defendant Langi. He 
testified that he had told police that he had only met Langi the night of the 
crime, when in fact, he had known Langi for some time. 
11. George Afu also testified that he had been offered a plea bargain and had 
pled guilty to a reduced charge of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree 
Felony, in exchange for testifying against defendant Langi. 
12. At the time he entered his plea, Afu, who was then represented by David C. 
Biggs, executed a "Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel, and 
Order." That document was written in English. 
13. In executing the Statement of Defendant, Afu acknowledged that he could 
"read and understand the English language," or that "an interpreter has been 
provided to me." 
14. George Afu testified that he had participated in assaulting Jose Farias and 
Gabriel Calvillo, and that when defendant Langi got into his car, Langi 
appeared to be holding a wallet and money with blood on it. George Afu 
indicated that he had not seen Langi take the wallet, because Afu had already 
left the restaurant to go get the car. 
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15. On cross-examination, George Afu was asked whether it was the detectives 
who interviewed him who first raised the issue of the bloody money. Afu 
indicated that he could not remember. When shown one portion of the 
transcript of that interview, Afu stated that it was the detectives who raised 
the issue. On re-direct, and upon being shown an earlier portion of the 
transcript, Afu acknowledged that it was he who first notified detectives that 
he had seen defendant Langi holding bloody money. 
16. Afu was also questioned on cross-examination about the plea bargain he had 
received in exchange for his agreement to testify against defendant Langi. 
He was shown a copy of the Statement of Defendant he had executed in 
connection with his plea, and acknowledged that it indeed bore his signature. 
17. After the State rested, defendant indicated that he did not wish to take the 
stand in his own behalf. Defendant called no other witnesses. 
18. At the conclusion of the two-day trial, and following slightly more than two 
hours of deliberation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as 
charged on both counts of Aggravated Robbery, and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that in committing the offenses, the defendant had acted in 
concert with two or more persons, subjecting him to the group enhancement. 
19. Defendant was sentenced on June 11, 2001. This Court imposed two 
indeterminate terms of 9 years to life, and ordered that the two terms run 
concurrently and not consecutively. 
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20. Defendant then timely filed a Motion for New Trial, attached to which were 
what purported to be affidavits from three people: George Afu, Samuel 
Misini, and Fineeva Maka. 
21. The affidavit of George Afu contains a statement indicating that he "lied on 
the investigator's report," and that "because of the prosecutor's pushing, and 
coaching questions, I have to lie." The affidavit bears George Afu's 
signature and was notarized on May 23, 2001. 
22. The affidavit of Samuel Misini contains a statement indicating that George 
Afu told him "he has to lie in court, because of the prosecutor's pushing, and 
coaching questions." The Misini affidavit further claimed that George Afu 
told Minisi that "it was the prosecutor and the investigator who told him 
about the stolen items, but he did not see Joe took or stolen [sic] anything 
from the victims, because he has left first to pick up the vehicle." 
23. In his memorandum in support of his motion for new trial, defendant Langi 
alleged that the affidavit of George Afu contained an admission that Afu had 
perjured himself during the trial. He later characterized the discovery of 
Afu's "perjury" as newly discovered evidence. 
24. Based upon the allegations leveled in defendant's memorandum, the State 
contacted George Afu's attorney, David C. Biggs. Mr. Biggs and Afu agreed 
to an interview on the subject of the perjury allegation. 
25. During the interview, Afu was read his Miranda rights, and informed that he 
was under investigation for perjury. Afu agreed to waive his right to remain 
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silent, and agreed to speak with Sergeant Kevin Judd. David Biggs was 
present during the entire interview. 
26. David Biggs informed Sgt. Judd, on behalf of his client, that Afu does not 
read English well. He indicated that at the time Afu signed the affidavit 
which defendant attributed to him, he was not able to read the big words, and 
that his wife had paraphrased it but apparently not read the document word 
for word. 
27. Afu admitted to having signed the affidavit, but indicated that he did not 
understand what it said. 
28. Afu indicated that he believed that in the affidavit, he was only admitting that 
he had not been truthful to investigators when he was asked about his 
relationship with defendant Langi. 
29. Afu stated that he did not lie to police or anyone else about anything 
pertaining to the events that occurred at Beto's Restaurant on February 26, 
2000. 
30. Afu vehemently denied on several occasions during his interview with Sgt. 
Judd that he had lied to the jury during defendant Langi's trial. 
31. Afu further denied that any State prosecutor had ever coached him as to his 
answer to any question, and further indicated that he had not been pressured 
or coerced. Afu's counsel confirmed that he had been present during the 
prosecutors' meetings with his client, and had never witnessed any such 
inappropriate behavior on the part of the State's attorneys. 
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32. Afu affirmatively stated that he had been truthful when he testified at 
defendant Langi's trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The revelation in the affidavit of George Afu that he lied to investigators does 
not constitute newly discovered evidence. All of the matters about which Afu 
admitted lying were matters know to the defendant at the time of trial. 
Defendant was certainly aware of the fact that he had known Afu prior to 
February 26, 2000, and was similarly aware that he had spent the night over 
at Afu's house on the night of February 26, 2000. Moreover, because 
defendant was present at the time the crimes at Beto's were committed, any 
discrepancies between Afu's version of events and his own were certainly 
know to defendant prior to trial. Because these matters were known to 
defendant prior to trial, they do not constitute newly discovered evidence. 
2. The affidavit of George Afu, submitted by defendant, is on its face, 
insufficient to establish that Afu testified falsely at trial. Despite defendant's 
characterization of it, the affidavit does not contain an admission by Afu that 
he lied on the witness stand when he testified at defendant's trial. To the 
contrary, the affidavit indicates only that Afu lied to investigators, a fact 
which he admitted to the jury. Defendant's assertion that Afu perjured 
himself at trial is, therefore, unsupported. 
3. The affidavits of Samuel Misini and Fineeva Maka are double hearsay and 
are so unreliable that this Court declines to consider thern when evaluating 
defendant's motion for new trial. 
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4. Defense counsel had ample opportunity, prior to trial, to conduct an interview 
with George Afu in order to ascertain any information that as not a part of the 
formal interview conducted by police. Therefore, any information disclosed 
during trial about which defense counsel had no prior knowledge could have, 
with due diligence, been discovered prior to trial. 
5. Defendant's trial counsel conducted a competent cross-examination of 
George Afu which appropriately addressed the issue of the plea agreement he 
had reached with prosecutors in exchange for his testimony, and on the fact 
that because he had left the restaurant prior to the robbery, Afu did not 
actually witness defendant Langi removing or attempting to remove any 
property from the victims. 
6. Based upon the transcript of Sergeant Kevin Judd's interview with George 
Afu, this Court finds that George Afu did not perjure himself during 
defendant Langi's trial. Any inconsistencies in his statements, or bias that 
may have arisen as a result of Afu's plea agreement with the State, were 
properly explored on cross-examination. 
7. Also based upon this Court's review of the transcript of Sgt. Judd's interview 
with George Afu, this Court is satisfied that no representative of the State 
coached George Afu regarding his testimony, nor was George Afu coerced or 
pressured by any representative of the State. 
8. Notwithstanding defendant's argument to the contrary, the evidence of 
defendant's guilt in this case was overwhelming. The videotape admitted 
into evidence, which captured the offenses in progress, provided sufficient 
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evidence to convict defendant. That video, particularly when coupled with 
the testimony of Jose Farias, Gabriel Calvillo, Rachel Redding, and George 
Afu, was so compelling that it makes the likelihood of a different result 
extremely remote. That is, even if this Court were to determine that some 
newly discovered evidence existed which could not have been discovered 
with due diligence prior to trial, that new evidence would not make a 
different result probable at a new trial. 
9. Because this Court was not provided a transcript or other recording of George 
Afu's guilty plea in connection with his own involvement in the events that 
occurred at Beto's on February 26, 2000, this Court did not consider any 
issue related to the entry of that plea in reaching these Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
This Court hereby enters the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on the issue of defendant's Motion for New Trial. Based upon those findings, and for the 
reasons enumerated above, defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
DATED this J^/ day of_}U_c^_, Jtj 
T>TAH 
j'hftdfDifctrict Court i 
THIV.!-> • : O V - • - • , * 
Approved as to form: 
Attorney for Defendant Joseph Langi 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 6,h day of February, 2002,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Defendant's Motion 
for New Trial to be mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to: Joseph Jardine, Attorney 
for Defendant Joseph Langi, 39 Exchange Place, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH MAKA LANGI, 
Defendant. 
REG MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No: 001917415 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
Date: 03/15/2002 
Clerk: heathemh 
HAVING RECEIVED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE COURT SIGNS STATE'S PROPOSED ORDER AS 
DRAFTED. 
;isRstss*s*: 
Page 1 (last) 
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Case No: 001917415 
Date: Mar 15, 2002 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 001917415 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail WISSLER SIRINA 
PAYOR 
in-
Mail JOSEPH JARDINE 
ATTORNEY DEF 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Dated t h i s j B day of (WAVch , 20 (XL. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 2 ( las t ) 
EdwinS. Wall, A7446 ^ / ^ ^ ' 
WALL LAW OFFICES - ••<.<: 02 ^ W W * 
68 South Main Street, Suite 800 tf:-l \ - J "" ^ ^ 8^™ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 ' ; u T Y 
Phone Number: (801) 523-3445 '"*" __ 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOSEPH LANGI, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 001917415 FS 
Hon. Judith S.H. Atherton 
ORDER OF 
FINAL JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT 
On April 25,2001, the defendant was tried before a Jury and convicted on two counts of 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of U.C. § 76-6-302, as amended. 
On June 11,2001, the Court sentenced Mr. Langi in open court. The court imposed 
sentence as follows: (a) on Count I, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State prison, (b) 
on Count II, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, to an indeterminate term of not less than 
five years and which may be life in the Utah State prison; (c) with respect to Count I and Count 
II, that the terms of imprisonment on Count I and Count II shall run concurrent with one another; 
A-86 
and further found (d) that Mr. Langi's sentence was subject to gun and gang enhancements, said 
findings being of record and thus ordered the defendant to serve a term of not less than nine (9) 
years and which may be for life in the Utah State Prison. 
The Court remanded the defendant to the custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
On June 11,2001, the Court further ordered that the defendant pay restitution in the 
amounts of $3,728.47 and $3,603.53, together with such interest as might be authorized by law. 
On September 19,2002, the Court of Appeals for the State of Utah entered its 
Memorandum Decision in State of Utah v. Joseph Maka Langi
 y Case No. 20020396-CA, 2002 
UT App 296 in which the Court of Appeals stated: 
The district court docket reflects that Langi was orally sentenced on June 11, 
2001. However, no signed judgment and sentence appears in the district court 
record that was transmitted to the Court. Because no final and appealable 
judgment has been entered, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.... The time for 
initiating an appeal will not commence until entry of the signed judgment and 
sentence in the district court. 
* * * 
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to a 
timely appeal filed after the entry of final judgment. 
NOW THEREFORE, this Court enters its Final Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in 
the present case in accordance with the pronouncement of the court on June 11,2001, to wit: 
ORDER 
IT IS ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that Mr. Joseph Maka Langi is sentenced on Count 
I, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, to an indetermanant term of not less than five years 
2 
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and which may be life in the Utah State prison. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that Mr. Joseph Maka Langi is 
sentenced on Count II, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, to an indetermanant term of 
not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State prison. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the sentences imposed by this 
court with respect to Count I and Count II shall run concurrent with one another. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND ORDERED, pursuant to the findings made of 
record in this matter, that Mr. Langi's sentence is subject to gun and gang enhancements, and that 
the sentence that has been imposed upon him by this court shall be so enhanced and that Mr. 
Joseph Maka Langi shall serve a term of not less than nine (9) years and which may be for life in 
the Utah State Prison. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND ORDERED, pursuant to the findings made of 
record in this matter, that Mr. Langi pay restitution in this matter in the amounts of $3,728.47 
and $3,603.53, together with such interest as might be authorized by law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Joseph Maka Langi be, and has been, remanded 
the defendant to the custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff for transportation to the Utah State 
Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Joseph Maka Langi be, and hereby is, committed 
to the Utah State Department of Corrections, Utah State Prison, and that such commitment is and 
shall be effective as of June 11,2001. 
FURTHERMORE, IT IS ORDERED this is, and shall be construed to be, the final 
written order of judgment, sentence and commitment of the court in the above-entitled matter, for 
which the defendant has the right of a direct appeal. 
Done in chambers this day of , 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
A/ 
District Judge 
4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Edwin S. Wall, do hereby certify that on this ' <jay of A^y**-^^— . 
November, 2002, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the person 
at the address indicated below by placing the same into the United States Postal Service, first 
class postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
District Attorney's Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edwin S. Wall 
Attorney at Law 
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Edwin S. Wall, A7446 
WALL LAW OFFICES 
68 South Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Phone Number: (801) 523-3445 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOSEPH LANGI, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 001917415 FS 
Hon. Judith S.H. Atherton 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Joseph Langi, Defendant in the above-entitled action, 
hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the Judgment of Conviction rendered against 
him on November 13,2002, by the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton, Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Mr. Langi was sentenced by the court on Count I and Count II, both Aggravated 
Robberies, to two concurrent terms, enhanced by a gang enhancement. Mr. Langi sentence in 
this matter is to serve a term of not less than nine (9) years and which may be for life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
He was further ordered to pay restitution in the amounts of $3,728.47 and $3,603.53, 
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together with such interest as might be authorized by law. 
Respectfully submitted this Z_ day of »4»»^w . 2002. 
Edwin S. Wall, Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Edwin S. Wall, do hereby certify that on this %> day ofA^>/£ 
_ , 2002, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was served upon the person at the 
address indicated below by placing the same into the United States Postal Service, first class 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Ms. Sirena Wissler 
District Attorney's Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
f 
Edwin S. Wall 
Attorney at Law 
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